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REPEATING THE FAILURES OF CARBON TRADING  
Brittany A. Harris † 
Abstract: Carbon emissions trading, or cap-and-trade, is increasingly in vogue 
among Pacific Rim countries as a means of combating climate change.  In theory, cap-
and-trade promises to solve climate change by capping and gradually reducing the 
amount of carbon dioxide and greenhouse gas emissions, and to do so with maximum 
economic efficiency.  In reality, environmentally effective and economically efficient 
carbon emission trading systems have eluded both the international community and the 
European Union, and in practice have arguably increased emissions by artificially 
prolonging and legitimizing reliance on fossil fuels.   
In spite of this poor track record, five countries on the Pacific Rim committed to 
reducing their carbon dioxide emissions through domestic trading systems:  Australia, 
China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea.  Although these countries’ commitment to 
mitigating climate change is admirable, their domestic carbon emissions trading systems 
are characterized by the very same features that rendered the Kyoto Protocol’s 
international carbon market and the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme utterly 
ineffective.  These countries are consciously repeating the same mistakes and expecting 
different results.  Analyzing these five experiments, this comment identifies the features 
that will likely undermine the environmental and efficiency goals of these systems. This 
comment argues that due to these shortcomings, the emissions trading systems on the 
Pacific Rim will not lower carbon dioxide emissions to safe levels—instead, they will 
exacerbate climate change by artificially prolonging and legitimizing the use of fossil 
fuels.  In addition, the reappearance on the Pacific Rim of these unsound design features 
lends credence to the theory that emissions trading is fundamentally unreliable as a 
means of regulating and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea each 
implemented emissions trading systems to reduce their domestic carbon 
emissions and slow climate change.  This is incredibly significant because 
the Asian Pacific region has one of the highest aggregate greenhouse gas 
emissions in the world, emitting 7.9 billion tons of carbon dioxide 
equivalent (“tCO2e”) 1  a year in the mid-1990s.2   By 2011, these five 
countries generated 10,936.33 million metric tons of carbon dioxide 
emissions from the consumption of energy alone, of which 8,715.31 million 
                                                      
† Juris Doctor expected in 2014, University of Washington School of Law.  The author is grateful to 
Professor Melissa J. Durkee for her help in developing this comment, and thanks Michael J. Madderra and 
Kate M. Mead of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their insightful comments and critiques. 
1  tCO2e measures the equivalent carbon dioxide concentration that causes the same level of 
absorption in the atmosphere for other greenhouse gases.  Glossary: Carbon dioxide equivalent, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm?id=C (last visited Apr. 30, 2014). 
2  Sixth compilation and synthesis of initial national communications from Parties not included in 
Annex I to the Convention: Inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of 
greenhouse gases, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change 8, Oct. 25, 2005, 
FCCC/SBI/2005/18/Add.2, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/sbi/eng/18a02.pdf. 
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metric tons originated in China3—the largest global emitter.4  Australia is the 
world’s fifteenth largest emitter and emits more greenhouse gas per capita 
than any developed nation; 5  Japan, despite its efficiencies and large 
renewable energy sector,6 is the world’s fifth largest emitter of greenhouse 
gases;7 New Zealand contributes comparatively little to greenhouse gas 
emissions globally, but it has the twelfth highest emissions per capita in the 
developed world; 8  finally, South Korea is the world’s seventh largest 
greenhouse gas emitter and one of the fastest growing emissions sources.9  If 
these five countries successfully reduce their domestic emissions, their 
collective efforts could drastically slow climate change and influence other 
countries’ climate change policies.  
These five countries, however, have elected to design and implement 
carbon emissions trading systems.  Despite the inability to develop an 
environmentally effective and economically efficient carbon emissions 
trading system in Europe10 or internationally through the Kyoto Protocol,11 
                                                      
3  International Energy Statistics, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=90&pid=44&aid=8&cid=ww,r7,&syid=2006&e
yid=2011&unit=MMTCD (last visited Apr. 30, 2014).  These figures include emissions from motor 
vehicles and coal and gas power stations, but exclude emissions from other sources such as agriculture, 
livestock, and deforestation.  See id. 
4  Elisabeth Rosenthal, China Increases Lead as Biggest Carbon Dioxide Emitter, N.Y. TIMES (June 
14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/14/world/asia/14china.html?_r=0. 
5  See Nick Evershed, Carbon Dioxide Emissions: How Does Australia Compare?, THE GUARDIAN 
(July 15, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2013/jul/16/australia-carbon-tax-emissions 
(citing 2010 data compiled by the World Resources Institute). 
6  See Joshua Meltzer, After Fukushima: What’s Next for Japan’s Energy and Climate Change 
Policy?, GLOBAL ECON. AND DEV. AT BROOKINGS 2 (Sept. 7, 2011), 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/9/07%20after%20fukushima%20meltzer/110
907_japaneseenergypolicy_final.pdf. 
7  Chisaki Watanabe & Alex Morales, Japan Cuts Emissions Goal in Setback for Climate Talks, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-15/j apan-sets-new-emissions-
target-in-setback-to-un-treaty-talks.html. 
8  MINISTRY FOR THE ENV’T, THE FRAMEWORK FOR A NEW ZEALAND EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/climate/ framework-
emissions-trading-scheme-sep07/html/page2.html. 
9  PETER SOPHER & ANTHONY MANSELL, ENVTL. DEFENSE FUND & INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING 
ASS’N, SOUTH KOREA, THE WORLD’S CARBON MARKETS: A CASE STUDY GUIDE TO EMISSIONS TRADING 1 
(May 2013), http://www.ieta.org/assets/Reports/EmissionsTradingAroundTheWorld/edf_ieta_korea_case 
_study_may_2013.pdf. 
10  European Climate Policy: Worse than Useless, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 25, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21595002-current-policies-are-mess-heres-how-fix-them-worse-
useless (observing that the European Union Emission Trading System does not incentivize emissions 
reductions and is riddled with exceptions); Carbon Trading: ETS, RIP?, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 20, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21576388-failure-reform-europes-carbon-market-
will-reverberate-round-world-ets (critiquing the massive surplus and falling prices of permits in the EU 
ETS and observing that even emissions trading proponents admit “[i]t may well become an example of 
what not to do”); Stanley Reed, After Failed Attempt in April, Europe Approves Emissions Trading System, 
N.Y. TIMES  (July 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/business/global/european-parliament-
acts-to-support-emissions-trading-system.html (noting that despite backloading measures, “the number of 
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cap-and-trade clearly remains a popular strategy.  The five emissions trading 
experiments on the Pacific Rim even share distinct features with the Kyoto 
Protocol’s carbon market and the European Emissions Trading System (“EU 
ETS”)—features that ultimately undermined the economic efficiency and 
environmental effectiveness of these earlier systems.12  Because the same 
characteristics that made emissions trading systems environmentally 
ineffective in the past are reappearing in the present iterations on the Pacific 
Rim, these experiments are unlikely to reduce emissions.  Instead, they will 
increase emissions by artificially prolonging and legitimizing the use of 
fossil fuels.  In addition, the persistence of these unsound design features 
lends credibility to the argument that emissions trading systems are 
intrinsically flawed in design or purpose.13  This suggests that if countries on 
the Pacific Rim are committed to regulating and reducing their emissions, 
emissions trading is not the solution.  
Part II of this comment explains the significance of climate change 
policy to these particular Pacific Rim countries, the previous international 
efforts to address climate change through emissions targets, deadlines, and 
emissions trading, the operation of an emissions trading system, and 
criticisms of emissions trading systems.  Part III analyzes the five emissions 
trading systems developing along the Pacific Rim and identifies the design 
features that will likely undercut their efficiency and limit their 
effectiveness.  In light of these shortcomings, Part IV concludes that these 
emissions trading systems will not be effective at reducing greenhouse gases 
and argues that countries dedicated to combating climate change should 
explore more effective methods of regulating and reducing emissions. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
allowances that will be held off the market, about 900 million, is estimated to be only about half of the 
surplus of permits that would otherwise have built up by 2020”); Bryan Walsh, If Carbon Markets Can’t 
Work in Europe, Can They Work Anywhere?, TIME (Apr. 17, 2013), http://science.time.com/ 
2013/04/17/if-carbon-markets-cant-work-in-europe-can-they-work-anywhere/ (arguing that the EU ETS is 
not an effective environmental policy). 
11  See Melissa J. Durkee, Persuasion Treaties, 99 VA. L. REV. 63, 73 (Mar. 2013) (quoting Sungjoon 
Cho & Claire R. Kelly, Promises and Perils of New Global Governance: A Case of the G20, 12 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 491, 497-98 (2012)) (explaining that international climate change treaties are difficult because 
“negotiators are alert to changing global circumstances and are loath to eliminate their future flexibility by 
making concrete commitments; treaties are often accompanied by reservations and other party-specific 
caveats that minimize the treaty’s effectiveness; and the treaty amendment process is ‘tortuous,’ such that 
treaties cannot adapt quickly to rapidly evolving global regulatory needs.”); Quirin Schiermeier, The Kyoto 
Protocol: Hot Air, NATURE (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.nature.com/news/the-kyoto-protocol-hot-air-
1.11882 (noting “the reductions made under the treaty were dwarfed by the rise in emissions not covered 
by the accord, especially in Asia,” and that “[t]he treaty . . . was based on ‘dubious economic assumptions 
and flawed accounting systems’”). 
12  See infra Parts II.C, III.B. 
13  See infra Parts II.C, III. 
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II. THE RISE OF EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEMS  
Regulating and reducing carbon dioxide emissions is an important 
objective internationally because A) carbon emissions are the primary cause 
of climate change,14 the effects of which are already being felt in countries 
along the Pacific Rim.  Initially expressed as mere targets and deadlines, 
B) international efforts to regulate carbon emissions are predominately 
market mechanisms such as emissions trading systems, rather than top-down 
regulatory schemes.  Accordingly, countries along the Pacific Rim elected 
emissions trading systems as the preferred method of regulating carbon 
emissions.  Rather than enforce specific emissions standards through civil or 
criminal sanctions, C) these systems are flexible, decentralized, and provide 
market incentives for reducing carbon emissions.  However, D) the ability of 
such systems to actually reduce greenhouse gas emissions has been the 
subject of much criticism following the Kyoto Protocol and EU ETS. 
A. To Reverse Climate Change, Countries Must Regulate its Primary 
Cause—Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
Humans are radically altering the chemical composition of the globe 
by burning hydrocarbons.  The concentration of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere surpassed pre-industrial values and is increasing steadily due to 
heavy reliance on fossil fuels.15  In 2011, atmospheric concentrations of 
carbon dioxide reached 391 parts per million, a level unprecedented in the 
last 800,000 years.16  Carbon dioxide absorbs sunlight that is reflected back 
towards space as infrared radiation; rather than escape Earth’s atmosphere, it 
converts into heat.17  The rise in global average temperatures since the mid-
twentieth century is “extremely likely” due to the high concentrations of 
anthropogenic18 greenhouse gas—primarily carbon dioxide.19 
Beyond increasing the average global temperature, increased carbon 
dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere profoundly alter the planet’s 
physical and biological systems.  Increased carbon dioxide concentrations 
                                                      
14  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 
2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT 
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, at 13 (Thomas F. Stocker et al., 2013), 
available at http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf. 
15  Id. at 11. 
16  Id.  
17  ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., GREENHOUSE GASES, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND ENERGY, (Apr. 2, 2004), 
available at http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/1605/ggccebro/chapter1.html. 
18  Meaning “resulting from the influence of human beings on nature.” Anthropogenic, MERRIAM 
WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/anthropogenic (last visited May 10, 2014). 
19  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 14, at 17. 
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have very likely contributed to sea-level rise during the late twentieth 
century.20  Likewise, carbon emissions have altered wind patterns and extra-
tropical storm tracks, exacerbated temperature extremes, and heightened risk 
of heat waves and frequency of heavy precipitation events.21  Increased 
carbon dioxide concentrations warm and acidify the ocean,22 which in turn 
negatively impacts marine life, particularly shell forming organisms, corals, 
and their dependent species.23  Some impacts may be irreversible.  For 
example, the loss of Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets may result in rising 
sea levels, major changes in coastlines, inundations of low-lying areas, and 
loss of habitat for arctic species. 24   Absent “substantial and sustained 
reductions of greenhouse gas emissions,” changes in the global climate 
system will escalate during the twenty-first century.25   
                                                      
20  Id. at 19 (concluding that “[i]t is very likely that there is a substantial anthropogenic contribution 
to the global mean sea level rise . . . based on the high confidence in an anthropogenic influence on the two 
largest contributions to sea level rise, that is thermal expansion and glacier mass loss”).  
21  See Thomas F. Stocker et al., 2013: Technical Summary, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE 
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF 
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 33, 72-73, 109-13 (Thomas F. Stocker et al., eds., 
2013), available at http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_ALL_FINAL.pdf; New 
Analyses Find Evidence of Human-caused Climate Change in Half of the 12 Extreme Weather and Climate 
Events Analyzed from 2010, NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Sept. 5, 2012), 
http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2013/20130905-extremeweatherandclimateevents.html (citing 
Thomas C. Peterson, Explaining Extreme Events of 2012 from a Climate Perspective, 94 BULLETIN OF THE 
AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y S1 (Sept. 2013), available at http://www.ametsoc.org/2012extremeevents 
climate.pdf) (explaining that human-induced climate change increased the probability and exacerbated the 
impact of extreme events in the United States in 2012, such as heat waves, drought, and storm surge and 
coastal inundation from Hurricane Sandy); John P. Holdren, Drought and Global Climate Change: An 
Analysis of Statements by Roger Pielke Jr. (Feb. 28, 2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/critique_of_pielke_jr_statements_on_drought.pdf (summarizing the 
mainstream views of the climate-science community on the relationship between climate change and the 
frequency, duration, and severity of drought in the western United States); Wyatt Andrews, NOAA Links 
Extreme Weather to Climate Change, CBS NEWS (July 10, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
18563_162-57469878/noaa-links-extreme-weather-to-climate-change (explaining that the 2011 record 
drought in Texas was made twenty times more likely by man-made warming and could not be explained by 
the natural variability of natural phenomenon alone.  That year, there were seven tornado outbreaks and 
increased hurricanes in North America, unprecedented flooding in Australia, and widespread drought in 
east Africa—all caused by the warmest La Niña in history.). 
22  Stocker et al., supra note 21, at 295, 297. 
23  See NAT’L CTRS. FOR COASTAL OCEAN SCI., NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., Ocean 
Acidification Promotes Disruptive and Harmful Algal Blooms on Our Coasts (Jan. 13, 2014), 
http://coastalscience.noaa.gov/news/climate/ocean-acidification-promotes-disruptive-and-harmful-algal-
blooms-on-our-coasts/; Stephanie Pappas, More Bad Global Warming News: Acidification Harming Sea 
Urchins, NBC NEWS (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.nbcnews.com/science/science-news/more-bad-global-
warming-news-acidification-harming-sea-urchins-f2D11624175 (explaining that acidification interferes 
with the ability of keystone species, such as green sea urchins, to digest, and has a harmful effect on 
calcification—the process marine animals use to build shells or skeletons with minerals from the water). 
24  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 14, at 9, 11, 25-26, 70-72, 323. 
25  Id. at 19. 
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Climate change will profoundly affect countries along the Pacific Rim 
in the twenty-first century.26  In East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and 
Australia, an increase in precipitation extremes related to the monsoon 
systems and cyclones is very likely.27  In East Asia and parts of Australia, 
heatwaves will likely increase in frequency, duration, and severity.28  In 
Australia, there is a risk of widespread and permanent damage to coral reef 
systems, species extinction, more frequent flooding and damage to key 
infrastructure, inundation of low-lying areas from rising sea levels, and a 
significant drop in agricultural production.29  East, Southeast, and South Asia 
could face some of the worst effects of global warming:  heat stress, extreme 
precipitation, flooding, drought, and water scarcity.30 
B. Countries Adopted Market-based Mechanisms to Reach International 
Targets and Deadlines for Reducing Emissions 
To counteract climate change, a number of countries committed to 
targets and deadlines to reduce their domestic carbon dioxide emissions.  
The first climate treaty at Rio de Janeiro led to the 1992 United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), which is the 
basis for all subsequent climate change negotiations.31  To date, 189 nations 
have ratified this convention.32  This agreement formalized the goal of 
stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations at safe levels, the principles of 
precaution, cost-effectiveness, and common but differentiated 
responsibilities, the obligation to report on greenhouse gas emissions and 
national measures to combat climate change, and the commitment for 
assistance and technology transfer to developing countries.33  UNFCCC is 
limited because it is legally non-binding and contains no qualitative limits or 
                                                      
26  See Stocker et al., supra note 21, at 106, 109-13, 135. 
27  Id. at 105-07, 1270, 1287. 
28  Id. at 162, 1270. 
29  Jeanavive McGregor & Jake Sturmer, UN Climate Change Report Card: Scientists Predict 
Australia Will Continue to Get Hotter, ABC NEWS (Mar. 23, 2014), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-03-
23/ipcc-working-group-ii-report-climate-change-australia/5339654. 
30  Robin McKie, Global Warming to Hit Asia Hardest, Warns New Report on Climate Change, THE 
OBSERVER (Mar. 22, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/mar/22/global-warming-hit-
asia-hardest. 
31 SCOTT D. DEATHERAGE, CARBON TRADING LAW AND PRACTICE 22 (2011).  
32  DANIEL BODANSKY & SOPHIE CHOU, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, 
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE EFFORTS BEYOND 2012: A SURVEY OF APPROACHES 1 (Dec. 2004), available at 
http://www.c2es.orgwww.c2es.org/docUploads/2012%20new.pdf. 
33  Id.; see also United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 3, May 9, 1992, 1771 
U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UFCCC]. 
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enforcement mechanisms. 34   However, it operates as a framework for 
negotiating binding limits among nations.35 
Convention parties incorporated cap-and-trade concepts in the first 
agreement negotiated under UNFCCC: the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.  Under the 
Kyoto Protocol, developed countries voluntarily agreed to reduce their 
domestic emissions to five percent below 1990 levels by the end of the first 
compliance period (2008 to 2012) through national greenhouse gas 
emissions reduction programs. 36   The Kyoto Protocol introduced three 
market-based mechanisms: Joint Implementation (“JI”), the Clean 
Development Mechanism (“CDM”), and international emissions trading.37  
Under JI, countries with emissions reduction commitments earn emission 
reduction units (“ERUs”) towards their target from emission reduction or 
emission removal projects in countries with emissions reduction 
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol.38  Under the CDM, developed 
countries may elect to meet their targets by initiating emissions reduction 
projects in developing countries that have no reduction commitments.39  A 
key condition is “additionality”:  CDM projects must lead to emissions 
reductions “beyond business as usual,” or beyond what would have been 
achieved without the incentive to earn ERUs.40  Finally, parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol that reduce their emissions below their target levels earn excess 
credits that may be sold to countries that are over their targets.41  These 
mechanisms created an international carbon market.   
Near the end of the first compliance period, countries convened in 
Durban, South Africa, and Doha, Qatar, to negotiate the terms of a second 
                                                      
34  See Harro van Asselt & Joyeeta Gupta, Stretching Too Far? Developing Countries and the Role of 
Flexibility Mechanisms Beyond Kyoto, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 311, 319 (2009). 
35  See DEATHERAGE, supra note 31, at 41-42, 46-48. 
36  See generally Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998), available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.  Developing countries, such as China, had no limits.  
DEATHERAGE, supra note 31, at 22. 
37  The Mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol: Emissions Trading, the Clean Development 
Mechanism and Joint Implementation, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/items/1673.php (last visited May 10, 2014). 
38  Joint Implementation (JI), UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/joint_implementation/items/1674.php (last visited May 10, 
2014). 
39  Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/clean_development_mechanism/items/ 
2718.php (last visited May 10, 2014); DEATHERAGE, supra note 31, at 22-23. 
40  DEATHERAGE, supra note 31, at 23. 
41  International Emissions Trading, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/emissions_trading/items/2731.php (last visited May 
10, 2014). 
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compliance period under the Kyoto Protocol.42  Parties agreed to extend the 
protocol through 2020, but the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitters, 
China and the United States, refused to adopt mandatory and quantitative 
emissions reduction targets. 43   Japan and New Zealand declined to 
participate in a second compliance period.44  Without going into the merits 
of emissions trading systems, this extension of the Kyoto Protocol will likely 
be insufficient to counteract climate change given the number of large 
emitters not participating and the obsolete targets and baseline standards 
contemplated by the new protocol.45 
Although the Kyoto Protocol had a negligible environmental impact,46 
in part because the world’s largest emitters of greenhouse gases refused to 
adopt binding emissions reductions,47 it was tremendously successful at  
promoting market mechanisms as a method of regulating greenhouse gas 
emissions.  The EU ETS, launched in 2005, was the first international 
mandatory cap-and-trade system.48  It was designed to help member states 
                                                      
42  Durban, Towards Full Implementation of the UN Climate Change Convention, UNITED NATIONS 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/key_steps/durban_outcomes/items/ 
6825.php; The Doha Climate Gateway, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://unfccc.int/key_steps/doha_climate_gateway/items/7389.php. 
43  Doha Outcome: Kyoto Protocol Lives, Global Climate Deal by 2015, ENVIRONMENT NEWS, (Dec. 
8, 2012), http://ens-newswire.com/2012/12/08/doha-outcome-kyoto-protocol-lives-global-climate-deal-by-
2015/. 
44  Matrin Khor, A ‘Low Ambition’ Outcome in Doha, THIRD WORLD NETWORK (Jan/Feb 2013), 
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/resurgence/2013/269-270/cover01.htm (noting that original Kyoto 
Protocol parties Russia, Japan, and New Zealand decided not to join a second commitment period, and 
Canada dropped out of the protocol entirely).   
45  Id. (pointing out that the emissions cuts to which countries agreed are in aggregate only 18% 
below the 1990 level by 2020, compared with the 25-40% reduction required to restrict global temperature 
rise to two degrees Celsius); David Hodgkinson, Doha climate talks: time for an alternative approach, 
EAST ASIA FORUM (Dec. 24, 2012), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/12/24/doha-climate-talks-time-for-
an-alternative-approach/ (observing that at Doha, “not ‘a single new pledge to cut pollution from a major 
emitter’ was made,” and questioning “whether the UN system provided ‘cover for leaders to take no 
meaningful action’”). 
46  Robert W. Hahn, Climate Policy: Separating Fact From Fantasy, 33 HARV. ENVT’L L. REV. 557, 
559 (2009). 
47  The United States and China, the two largest contributors to global warming, have not agreed to 
binding, quantitative emissions reductions.  See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating 
Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade, 
28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 11, 17-18 (2009) (noting that the United States initially used its influence to 
exclude mandatory emissions reductions from the UNFCCC, and later refused to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol); Jason J. Czarnezki, Climate Policy & U.S. China Relations, 12 VT. J. ENVT’L. L. 659, 666 (2011) 
(noting that China signed the Kyoto Protocol but, like other developing countries, only agreed to mitigation 
measures, not quantitative emissions reductions); Lost in Translation, INST. FOR ENERGY RESEARCH (July 
28, 2009), http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2009/07/28/lost-in-translation/ (explaining that China 
historically denied responsibility for emissions, and quoting Minister Xie Zhenhua as stating that “[t]he 
primary responsibility for talking climate change should rest with the developed countries”). 
48  EU ETS 2005-2012, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/pre2013/ 
index_en.htm (last visited May 10, 2014). 
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meet their emissions reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol.49  Likewise, 
the emissions trading systems in Australia, Japan, and New Zealand were 
initially adopted to help meet Kyoto Protocol targets and designed to link 
with the EU ETS and the Kyoto Protocol’s international carbon market.50 
Apart from committing to targets and deadlines under the Kyoto 
Protocol, many countries made international commitments to reduce or limit 
their domestic emissions by the year 2020 under the Copenhagen Accord.51  
These targets vary—for example, the targets for Australia, New Zealand, 
South Korea, and formerly Japan are expressed as a percentage reduction in 
emissions relative to the level of emissions in a base year—a base year that 
varies from 1990 for Japan and New Zealand to 2000 for Australia.52  
Commitments for China are expressed as a reduction in emissions intensity, 
or emissions per unit of GDP, against the base year of 2005.53 
 
Country Commitment to Limit Emissions by 2020 Relative to Various Base 
Years54 
Australia 5-25% below 2000 levels.  Moving above five percent is contingent on 
global, comprehensive agreement. 
China 40-45% below 2005 emissions intensity levels.  Increase the 
proportion of non-fossil fuels used in primary energy consumption to 
15% and increase forest coverage by 40 million hectares and forest 
stock volume by 1.3 billion cubic meters relative to 2005. 
                                                      
49  Id. 
50  See Australia National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (Cth) s 3(Austl.), available at 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2013C00521 (objects: to meet international reporting requirements); 
Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 3 (Austl.) available at http://www.comlaw.gov/au/Details/C2013C00372 
(objectives:  to give effect to Australia’s obligations under the Climate Change Convention and the Kyoto 
Protocol); Climate Change Response Act 2002 s 3 (NZ) available at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/ 
act/public/2002/0040/latest/DLM158590.html (aiming to enable New Zealand to meet its international 
obligations under the Convention and the Protocol); see generally GLOBAL WARMING PREVENTION 
HEADQUARTER, KYOTO PROTOCOL TARGET ACHIEVEMENT PLAN (2005) (Japan), available at 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/kyoto/050428plan_e.pdf (describing the global warming 
countermeasures, including a voluntary emissions trading system, designed to achieve Japan’s promise 
under the Kyoto Protocol).  
51  Rep. of the Conference of the Parties, 15th Sess., Dec. 7-Dec. 19 2009, U.N. Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010), available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf. 
52  AUSTRALIAN GOV’T PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, CARBON EMISSION POLICIES IN KEY ECONOMIES, 
(May 2011) 16-17, http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/109830/carbon-prices.pdf. 
53  Id. 
54  Id. at 17.  This table from the Australian Government Productivity Commission is based on the 
calculations of McKibbin, Morris, and Wilcoxen (2010), who attempted to convert the Copenhagen targets 
to equivalent targets with common base years.  Id.  These authors found that varying the base years affects 
the apparent stringency of these targets.  For example, Australia’s commitment to an unconditional 
emissions reduction of five percent below 2000 levels is equivalent to each of the following:  a 30% 
increase in emissions relative to 1990 levels, a 18% reduction relative to 2005 levels, and a 35% reduction 
relative to business as usual levels in 2020.  Id. 
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Japan 25% below 1990 levels, contingent on all major economies joining a 
fair and effective international framework with ambitious targets. 
New Zealand 10-20% below 1990 levels, contingent on global, comprehensive 
agreement. 
South Korea 30% below business as usual levels.55 
 
All five countries implemented emissions trading systems to help meet these 
2020 targets.  The figures above demonstrate that Japan committed to the 
largest reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 (48%) and Australia’s 
commitment is in line with that of Europe (36%) and the United States 
(33%), whereas China’s commitment is smaller (22%). 56   Yet Japan 
abandoned its Copenhagen commitments in November 2013, explaining that 
the Fukushima meltdown caused Japan to reevaluate its nuclear energy 
programs and that consequently a 25% reduction from 1990 levels is 
“unfeasible.”57  Japan’s revised climate goal is a three percent increase in 
greenhouse gas emissions above 1990 levels.58 
C. Elements of an Emissions Trading System 
Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea selected 
emissions trading systems as the preferred method of regulating carbon 
emissions and meeting their Copenhagen or future Kyoto Protocol targets.  
Unlike a command-and-control regime, in which a government enforces 
specific emissions standards through civil or criminal sanctions,59 market-
based mechanisms such as emissions trading systems are, in theory, flexible 
and decentralized.60  Private project developers and capital investors, rather 
than state or national governments, identify and implement carbon reduction 
projects. 61   Emissions trading systems give regulated parties financial 
incentives to curb emissions through efficiency and innovation, either 
                                                      
55  “Business as usual levels” refer to the projected level of greenhouse gas emissions assuming no 
reduction or mitigation measures are taken.  Unlike historical emissions data for a baseline year such as 
1990, which is fixed, the projected level of emissions in 2020 may be higher or lower than the actual level 
of emissions.  Therefore, it may be misleading to equate meeting such targets with actual reductions in 
emissions—it depends on how close the projected and actual levels of emissions are. 
56  AUSTRALIAN GOV’T PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, supra note 52, at 17-18.   
57  Sarah Lazare, Slap in the Face: Japan Uses Fukushima Nuclear Disaster to Ditch Carbon Targets, 
COMMON DREAMS (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2013/11/15-2. 
58  Id. 
59  DEATHERAGE, supra note 31, at 16-17. 
60  Id. at 17-18 (reflecting “the need in the climate change context to make millions of decisions about 
taking actions in millions of places all over the world, or even at the state or national level”). 
61  Id. 
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because they want to avoid fines for exceeding allowable emissions or 
because pollution reductions generate financial assets that they can sell.62   
An important feature of an emissions trading system is the cap.  After 
the government determines what industries or facilities are liable for specific 
emissions, it sets an overall emissions target, an absolute cap, which is the 
sum of all allowable emissions from liable facilities.63  Total emissions may 
not exceed this cap, which decreases over time.64  Although the price of 
emissions fluctuates with the market for tradable allowances, the absolute 
amount of emissions into the atmosphere is theoretically controllable.65 
Tradable allowances, or emission credits, are rights to pollute that are 
either auctioned or allocated freely from the government to liable entities.66  
These allowances authorize the release of a specified amount of greenhouse 
gas emissions, typically one allowance per tCO2e.67  Emitters may comply 
with emissions reductions by actually reducing their emissions or by 
purchasing allowances from a more efficient party that has reduced its own 
emissions more than required.68  Additionally, such systems typically allow 
pollution “offsets,” meaning that emissions reductions from activities that 
are not regulated can be used to meet the reductions required in activities 
that are regulated.69 
At this point, one major shortcoming of emissions trading systems is 
clear:  such systems are designed to regulate emissions from discrete and 
typically fixed sources, such as fossil-fuel-based power generation 
facilities.70  This design makes sense because it is simpler to verify and 
monitor emissions from large, discernible, and fixed sources.  However, it 
means that these systems are maladapted to regulate the smaller or diffuse 
sources of carbon emissions, such as private transportation, livestock, and 
                                                      
62  See id. at 19. 
63  Id. 
64  Id. at 19-20. 
65  Brian C. Murray et al., Balancing Cost and Emissions Certainty: An Allowance Reserve for Cap-
and-Trade, 3 REV. OF ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 84, 87 (2009). 
66  DEATHERAGE, supra note 31, at 19. 
67  Id.  For example, “assigned amount units” and other trading units in the Kyoto Protocol carbon 
market are each equal to one ton of CO2.  International Emissions Trading, supra note 41. 
68  DEATHERAGE, supra note 31, at 19. 
69  Id. 
70  One of the first cap-and-trade systems, the U.S. Acid Rain Program, was designed to regulate a 
total of 445 coal-burning electric utility plants in the U.S.  Acid Rain Program, UNITED STATES ENVT’L 
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progsregs/arp/basic.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2014).  
Environmentalist and carbon-intensive industries alike cite to the U.S. Acid Rain Program as a primary 
prototype.  Koushik Ghosh & Peter Gray, Rushing to Copenhagen? Is Cap-and-Trade the Answer?, 53 
CHALLENGE 5, 13 (2010). 
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agriculture, which also contribute significantly to climate change.71  The 
shortcomings of emissions trading systems will be explored in Part III, using 
the recent cap-and-trade experiments in Pacific Rim countries as examples.  
The next section identifies the major criticisms of emissions trading. 
D. Criticisms of Emissions Trading Systems  
 Emissions trading systems have come under a myriad of criticisms.  
The most frequently voiced concern is the immense hurdles to their 
implementation.  Despite their alleged “efficiency,” such systems conceal a 
number of inefficiencies in that they require an enormous amount of legal, 
institutional, and technological preparation apart from their high 
administrative costs.72  The integrity of emissions trading systems depends 
upon accurate monitoring, reporting, and verification of emissions.  
Unfortunately, direct pollution measurement and monitoring systems for 
greenhouse gases have large margins of error.73 Historical emissions data is 
typically provided by the regulated emitters themselves; many countries 
currently implementing emissions trading systems have weak environmental 
enforcement systems and lack far-reaching, uniform, and accurate systems 
for measurement and monitoring.74  Further, emissions trading systems are 
premised on the belief that emitters should internalize the cost of damage 
from climate change, yet calculating the monetary costs and benefits of 
pollution with the exactitude required by economic theory is impossible.75  
These barriers to adoption, implementation, and enforcement inevitably 
delay emissions reductions and undermine the efficiency claims of emissions 
trading proponents.76 
                                                      
71  See, e.g., Transportation and Climate, UNITED STATES ENVT’L PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/basicinfo.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2014) (explaining that in 2011, 
transportation represented approximately 27% of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions and over half of the 
net increase in total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 to 2011); MINISTRY OF BUS., INNOVATION & 
EMP’T, ENERGY GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS (2012) http://www.med.govt.nz/sectors-industries 
/energy/energy-modelling/publications/energy-greenhouse-gas-emissions/energy-greenhouse-gas-
emissions.pdf (last visited May 8, 2014) (stating that emissions from transport make up 43% of total 
emissions in New Zealand’s energy sector); see also supra Part III.A. 
72   Larry Lohmann, Carbon Trading—A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatization, and 
Power, 48 DEVELOPMENT DIALOG 1, 72, 102 (2006). 
73   Id. 
74  Id.  
75  Clive L. Splash & Alex Y. Lo, Australia’s Carbon Tax: A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing?, 23 ECON. & 
LABOUR RELATIONS REV. 67, 69 (2012) (arguing that attempts to calculate the monetary costs and benefits 
of human induced climate change “merely result[s] in rhetoric and conjecture”). 
76  Jason Scott Johnston, Problems of Equity and Efficiency in the Design of International 
Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Schemes, 33 HARV. ENVT’L L. REV. 405, 405-06 (2009) (arguing on the 
basis of evidence from the European Union’s experience that cap-and-trade suffers from inherent problems 
of enforceability and verifiability, which cause significant inefficiencies). 
JUNE 2014  REPEATING THE FAILURES OF CARBON TRADING 767 
Critics also argue that emissions trading systems may prolong the use 
of fossil fuels.  Businesses and political leaders predictably want more fossil 
fuel and less climate change;77 emissions trading systems are premised on 
society’s continued reliance on fossil fuels.  Under such a scheme, regulated 
entities only reduce carbon emissions when it is profitable 78 —when 
emissions allowances are over-allocated, such a system actually subsidizes 
emitters and prolongs reliance on fossil fuels.79  Consumers bear the cost of 
emissions reductions.80  Governments that adopt these systems assume that 
market forces will fix climate change by causing consumers and profit 
seeking firms to invest in efficient technological solutions over emissions-
intensive energy generation and products.81  Critics, however, doubt that 
pricing mechanisms can prompt the radical innovation and wholesale 
reorganization of our technological and economic structures that are 
necessary to halt climate change. 82   With political will directed at 
experimental technology and market fixes to climate change, policymakers 
can subordinate alternatives that entail substantial and systemic changes.83  
Critics worry that the true effect of emissions trading is to reward the 
                                                      
77  Lohmann, supra note 72, at 23. 
78  Jane Andrew et al., Carbon Tax: Challenging Neoliberal Solutions to Climate Change, 21 
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON TAXATION 611, 616 (2010) (explaining “[i]t would be possible for a firm to 
financially benefit from participating in an ETS by keeping business as usual as long as other firms were 
making reductions to pollution. . . A firm need not actually reduce carbon pollution in order to trade in an 
ETS.  Similarly, a firm may choose to pay a tax on its carbon pollution rather than incur capital expenditure 
to implement innovations to reduce pollution.  In an ETS the risk of not achieving carbon reduction will 
rest entirely with the government and its use of the relevant science to determine the necessary cap upon 
the collective carbon pollution of industry and government’s monitoring of carbon offsets.”).   
79  Dave Keating, Energy Intensive Industries Benefiting from ETS, Says Commission, 
EUROPEANVOICE (May 16, 2013), http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2013/may/energy-intensive-
industries-benefitting-from-ets-says-commission/77280.aspx (observing that due to the surplus of 
emissions allowances that plagued the EU ETS since its inception, the emissions trading system “has been 
a financial support to the energy intensive industries . . . who usually complain that the ETS is killing 
them”). 
80  Andrew et al., supra note 78 (observing that in emissions trading, “the responsibility for pollution 
is not placed with the polluter, and there need not be a direct link with carbon mitigation . . . That is, the 
responsibility of carbon emissions can bypass the polluter and be passed onto the consumer.  Accordingly: 
‘[a]n emissions trading scheme will see the price of electricity and manufactured goods go up but that is no 
guarantee that the market will invest in alternatives, especially if polluters can pass on the extra cost to 
consumers, buy up environmentally dubious permits, or be compensated for extra costs that might damage 
their international competitiveness.’”). 
81  Splash & Lo, supra note 75, at 71.  
82  Id.  See also Kevin Anderson & Alice Bows, A New Paradigm for Climate Change, 1 NATURE 
CLIMATE CHANGE 639, 639 (2012) (adding that academics “have contributed to a misguided belief that 
commitments to avoid warming of 2o Celsius can still be realized with incremental adjustments to 
economic incentives”). 
83  For example, ceasing the extraction of fossil fuels from the ground, commencing large-scale 
public works to reduce society’s fossil fuel dependency, shifting subsidies for fossil fuel exploration, 
extraction, refining, transport, and use to renewable energies, implementing green taxes, and adopting 
conventional pollution regulation.  Lohmann, supra note 72, at 330-31. 
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heaviest polluters by taking taxation and conventional regulation off the 
table while generating new sources of profit for polluters.84  This ensures 
continued investment in fossil-fuel based technologies and disadvantages 
industries that might investigate alternative energy.85  Tellingly, the fossil 
fuel industry does lobby heavily for emissions trading when it would 
forestall an alternative, more costly form of regulation: an emissions tax.86   
Finally, critics contend that emissions trading systems do not reduce 
emissions.  Although emissions trading systems have overall emissions caps 
that decrease over time, regulated parties may simply buy permits rather 
than reduce their emissions.87  If they cannot purchase surplus permits, then 
they can generate credits from offsets by investing in carbon-saving and 
carbon-sequestering projects—the climate effectiveness of which is highly 
uncertain.88  Or they can use their influence over the allocation process to 
secure a larger quantity of freely allocated permits.89  Emissions trading 
systems appear highly susceptible to rent-seeking, lobbying for special 
exemptions, and gaming through financial markets.90  Lastly, domestic and 
international fairness issues suggest that it will be years before meaningful 
international emission limits are adopted, let alone enforced. 91 
These criticisms, based on the failures of carbon trading under the 
Kyoto Protocol and EU ETS, are relevant to the experiments currently being 
undertaken along the Pacific Rim.  As explored below in Part III, the same 
hurdles to implementation and limited effectiveness plague the systems in 
Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea.  This supports the 
                                                      
84  Id. at 34, 50. 
85  Tamra Gilbertson & Oscar Reyes, Carbon Trading: How it Works and Why it Fails, 7 CRITICAL 
CURRENTS 1, 31 (2009). 
86  David G. Victor & Joshua C. House, BP’s Emissions Trading System, 34 ENERGY POLICY 2100, 
2101 (2006); see also Lohmann, supra note 72 (arguing that while companies will have to make reductions 
or pay up if emissions caps are tightened, “emissions trading encourages [companies] to treat global 
warming not as a social and environmental problem to be solved but as a business and public relations 
problem . . . to be managed at the least possible relative financial and market loss to themselves.  And it 
gives them the means to make sure caps are not tightened very much or very swiftly.  Far-sighted 
companies treat the carbon trading as an opportunity to gain new property rights, assets and openings for 
capital accumulation, even if climate change is accelerated in the process.” (italics in original)). 
87  See Lohmann, supra note 72, at 106; Andrew et al., supra note 78, at 616.  
88  Lohmann, supra note 72, at 137-139 (noting that it is difficult to measure the carbon stored); 
Christina K. Harper, Climate Change and Tax Policy, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 411, 447 (2007) 
(observing that the capacity of carbon sinks such as forests, soil, and ocean cannot possibly keep up with 
rising carbon emissions). 
89  Gilbertson & Reyes, supra note 85, at 35; see also Alan D. Viard, The Cap-and-Trade Giveaway, 
THE AMERICAN (June 26, 2009), http://www.american.com/archive/2009/june/the-cap-and-trade-giveaway 
(arguing that free allocation provides windfall gains to stockholders without restraining energy prices for 
consumers, and comparing a cap-and-trade system with freely allocated permits to a carbon tax in which 
the tax revenue is given to stockholders). 
90  Ghosh & Gray, supra note 70, at 13. 
91  Id. at 13-14; DEATHERAGE, supra note 31, at 48. 
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theory that the problems pervading emissions trading systems are not subject 
to correction through experience, but are inherent to the system itself. 
  
III. PACIFIC RIM EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEMS WILL BE INEFFICIENT, 
INEFFECTIVE, AND ULTIMATELY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE 
To regulate their domestic greenhouse gas emissions, particularly 
carbon dioxide emissions, Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South 
Korea are experimenting with emissions trading systems.  Most of these 
countries initially implemented such systems to meet targets and deadlines 
under the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent Copenhagen Accord.92  These 
countries’ decisions to mitigate climate change are admirable.  However, 
these systems have many features in common with the Kyoto Protocol 
carbon market and the EU ETS—features that rendered those systems 
inefficient and ineffective.  Therefore, emissions trading on the Pacific Rim 
A) undermines claims that emissions trading systems are an efficient form of 
regulation, and B) will likely fail to reduce emissions to safe levels, lending 
weight to the theory that emissions trading systems are inherently flawed. 
A.  Pacific Rim Countries Have Incurred Substantial Implementation and 
Administrative Costs, Negating Efficiency Claims 
 As explained in Part II.D, countries face two primary hurdles to 
implementing emissions trading systems that undermine their economic 
efficiency claims and, to an extent, their environmental effectiveness.  These 
are:  1) the substantial legal, institutional, and technological investment 
necessary to develop two distinct but interrelated regulatory systems, and 
2) the necessity of designing accurate mechanisms to measure, report, and 
verify emissions from a variety of sources, often in the context of a dearth of 
emissions data or lack of enforcement capacity.  Both hurdles accompany 
the current emissions trading experiments along the Pacific Rim. 
1. Emissions Trading Experiments on the Pacific Rim Require 
Substantial Legal, Institutional, and Technological Investment, 
Making them Particularly Complex, Contentious, and Costly  
 Emissions trading systems require a large amount of legal, 
institutional, and technological investment.  In addition to an environmental 
regulatory system, they require trading platforms for permits and a parallel 
                                                      
92  See infra Part II.B. 
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system of financial regulation.93  The necessity for consistent methodologies 
for estimating, reporting, verifying, and monitoring emissions of liable 
entities means that the resulting regulatory and advisory bodies require 
substantial technical support and resources to monitor and enforce 
compliance.94 All of this complexity raises the cost of implementing and 
administering an emissions trading system and negates proponents’ 
economic efficiency claims.   
Australia alone established a number of domestic regulatory and 
advisory bodies to implement their emissions trading system.  Australia’s 
Climate Change Authority advises on caps, tracks pollution levels, and 
reviews the carbon pricing mechanism; the Clean Energy Regulator 
administers the carbon pricing mechanism, the National Greenhouse and 
Energy Reporting scheme, the Renewable Energy Target, and the Carbon 
Farming Initiative; the Productivity Commission reviews the necessity and 
sufficiency of government assistance to industry; the Land Sector Carbon 
and Biodiversity Advisory Board oversees land sector initiatives; the Energy 
Security Council assesses emerging risks to energy security and offers loans 
to energy generators.95  If the Australian emissions trading system survives 
current attempts at repeal,96 then implementation and enforcement will be 
further complicated by linkage with international systems such as the EU 
ETS and the Kyoto Protocol. 97   Additionally, Australia is only in its 
                                                      
93  See, e.g., Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 47, at 38-39 (explaining that emissions trading 
systems are “inherently more complicated” compared to a “carbon tax”); Lohmann, supra note 72, at 72 
(pointing out that “in order to work, greenhouse gas trading has to create a special system of property rights 
in the earth’s carbon-cycling capacity”). 
94  See Toni E. Moyes, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading in New Zealand: Trailblazing 
Comprehensive Cap and Trade, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 911, 948 (2008) (explaining that “[r]eliable information 
about the emissions produced by participants in an ETS is vital to its integrity and effectiveness. Incorrect 
information interferes with the price of emissions units and the attainment of environmental goals of the 
scheme.  In turn, incorrect information undermines investor confidence in the ETS market and the basis 
upon which participants plan to either reduce emissions or purchase emissions units.  Emissions must be 
monitored accurately and consistently across participants and the collected data must be timely reported to 
both the regulator and the market.  Further, for confidence, the regulator must be able to verify that reported 
emissions data is correct.”). 
95  COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, AN OVERVIEW OF THE CLEAN ENERGY LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE 3 
(2012), available at http://heartland.org/sites/default/files/cef-overview_apr2012.pdf. 
96  Senators rejected the first bill in a package designed by the new government to scrap the clean 
energy laws on March 3, 2014.  It will be three months before the bill can be re-introduced to the Senate.  
AAP, Senators Reject Bill to Scrap Climate Change Authority, NAT’L AFFAIRS (Mar. 3, 2014), 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/policy/senators-reject-bill-to-scrap-climate-change-
authority/story-e6frg6xf-1226843760241. 
97  Foundations for Global Emissions Trading Set as Australia Linking with Europe, THE CLIMATE 
GROUP (Aug. 28, 2012), http://www.theclimategroup.org/what-we-do/news-and-blogs/foundations-for-
global-emissions-trading-set-as-australia-linking-with-europe/; Press Release, Australia Joins Kyoto 
Protocol Second Commitment as World on Track to 2015 Climate Change Agreement, DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, 
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transitional, fixed price period, which means that the Clean Energy 
Regulator is still designing an auction platform for the coming emissions 
trading phase.98   
 Like Australia, China is in a transitional phase, but one that entails a 
substantially more complex shift from multiple, independent pilots at the 
regional and municipal levels to a single, uniform national system.99  Prior to 
initiating a national emissions trading program, China’s 12th Five Year Plan 
(2011-2015) authorized multiple sub-national carbon emissions trading pilot 
programs. 100   Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Shenzhen, and Tianjin 
launched pilot emissions trading programs between June and December of 
2013;101 Hubei, Chongqing, and Hangzhou are developing parallel pilot 
programs.102  Because no national legislation reinforces these emissions 
trading systems, each local system is authorized by municipal or provincial 
administrative rules.103  Each pilot program is implementing or developing a 
separate environmental and financial regulatory system and trading 
platform,104 which will ultimately be succeeded by a national emissions 
trading system. 105   Although the National Development and Reform 
Commission is designing a national registry with the United Nations 
Development Programme, the pilots are currently developing individual 
                                                                                                                                                                 
AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, (Dec. 2, 2012), available at http://www.climatechange.gov.au/ministers/hon-greg-
combet-am-mp/media-release/australia-joins-kyoto-protocol-second-commitment-world. 
98  COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, STARTING EMISSIONS TRADING ON 1 JULY 2014: POLICY 
SUMMARY 3, 7 (2013), available at http://www.climatechange.gov.au/sites/climatechange/files/files/ 
reducing-carbon/carbon-pricing-policy/cef-policy-summary-moving-ets.PDF. 
99  See generally, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, TWELFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN (2011-2015), translated 
at http://www.britishchamber.cn/content/chinas-twelfth-five-year-plan-2011-2015-full-english-version. 
100  Id.; ANITA TALBERG & KAI SWOBODA, PARLIAMENTARY LIBRARY, EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEMES 
AROUND THE WORLD 21 (2013), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/ 
Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/2012-2013/EmissionsTradingSchemes. 
101  Beijing Launches Carbon Emissions Trading, XINHUA (Nov. 28, 2103), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/sci/2013-11/28/c_132926353.htm (noting that Shenzhen city was the 
first to launch its compulsory emissions trading market in June 2013 and that Shanghai launched its pilot 
earlier in November 2013); Guangdong Brings Carbon Trading to Life, XINHUA (Dec. 19, 2013), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-12/19/c_125887575.htm; Tianjin Starts Carbon Trading 
Market, XINHUA (Dec. 26, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-12/26/c_132999171.htm.  
102  Tianjin Starts Carbon Trading Market, supra note 101. 
103  JEFF SWARTZ, INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING ASS’N, A USER GUIDE TO EMISSIONS TRADING IN CHINA 
8 (2013), available at http://www.ieta.org/a-user-guide-to-emissions-trading-in-china--september-2013; 
Shanghai shi tan paifang guanli shixing banfa (hufu ling 10 hao) (上海市碳排放管理试行办法（沪府令 10 号）) 
[Carbon emissions management pilot scheme in Shanghai (Shanghai Office Ordinance No. 10)] 
(promulgated by the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, Nov. 18, 2013, effective Nov. 20, 2013), 
http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node2314/node2319/node12344/u26ai37414.html [hereinafter 
“Shanghai Ordinance No. 10”].  
104  See generally, SWARTZ, supra note 103. 
105  See NAT’L DEV. AND REFORM COMM’N, MARKET READINESS PROPOSAL (MRP): ESTABLISHING A 
NATIONAL EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME IN CHINA 1 (2013), available at 
http://www.thepmr.org/system/files/documents/China_MRP_final_19-02-2013rev_0.pdf. 
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registries.106  These pilots will give China some experience in designing and 
administering emissions trading systems. Yet China must make substantial 
investments in infrastructure and financial regulatory capacity before 
implementing a national emissions trading system, and these pilots will only 
provide a partial picture of China’s nationwide emissions. 
 In addition to developing adequate institutional capacity and 
expertise, these countries must make a number of technical decisions, many 
of which are unique to emissions trading systems.  These include setting and 
adjusting the national cap, deciding whether the cap is absolute or intensity-
based, setting penalties for non-compliance, and determining the scope of 
the emissions trading system—who is liable for which emissions and 
whether non-emitters, such as financial institutions, may participate. 107  
Countries must also decide how parties may meet their emissions reductions 
targets, whether and to whom allowances will be freely distributed or 
auctioned, whether banking or borrowing of allowances is allowed, and 
whether liable parties will be allowed to use carbon credits to offset their 
emissions. 108   Uniform standards to measure emissions and effective 
methods of monitoring and verifying emissions must be in place to verify 
compliance.109   The various emissions trading platforms must establish 
trading rules and require regulatory oversight. 110   There are further 
complications if the system is linked to other domestic or international 
systems, such as whether the government should put in place any price 
controls or subsidies.111   
For a system driven by neoliberal, unfettered free-market concepts, 
emissions trading requires a substantial amount of government investment 
and oversight, including the creation of “a new market structure, 
enforcement, audit, fraud prevention, and control mechanisms.”112  This 
                                                      
106  SWARTZ, supra note 103.  
107  Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 47, at 38-39; A. DENNY ELLERMAN & IAN SUE WING, MIT 
JOINT PROGRAM ON THE SCIENCE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL CHANGE, ABSOLUTE VS. INTENSITY-BASED 
EMISSION CAPS (2003), available at http://web.mit.edu/globalchange/www/MITJPSPGC_Rpt100.pdf.   
108  See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 47, at 38-39; DEATHERAGE, supra note 31, at 54-58. 
109  See generally National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (Cth) (Austl.), available at 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2013C00521; National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting 
(Measurement) Determination 2008 (Cth) (Austl.), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/ 
F2013C00661; National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting (Audit) Determination 2009 (Cth) (Austl.), 
available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2012C00678; National Greenhouse and Energy 
Reporting (Auditor Registration) Instrument 2012 (Cth) (Austl.), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ 
Details/F2012L02295. 
110  For an example of necessary regulations, see Shanghai Ordinance No. 10, supra note 103. 
111  Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 47, at 38-39. 
112  Andrew et al., supra note 78, at 613. 
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undermines proponent’s efficiency claims.113  As explained below, these 
systems are also inefficient because the countries implementing them lack 
adequate means to measure, monitor, and verify emissions and offsets. 
   
2.  Inadequate Mechanisms to Measure, Monitor, and Verify Emissions 
Will Make it Costly to Ensure Credits and Offsets Represent Actual 
Reductions 
  
 For an emissions trading system to be effective, countries need 
accurate emissions data.  Measuring, monitoring, and verifying emissions is 
crucial to set environmentally effective emissions cap, allocate allowances, 
and assess compliance.  Without reliable data, a country might set a cap too 
high to be environmentally effective and the prices of permits may plummet, 
reducing the incentive for regulated entities to cut emissions. 114   For 
example, the price of carbon emissions in the EU ETS collapsed to 
essentially zero in 2007 due to a lack of reliable actual emissions data, which 
led to an oversupply of permits;115 in January 2013, the price of permits sank 
to a new record of 4.76 euros (at the time, USD 6.37) per metric ton.116   
One of the advantages of China’s implementation of pilot programs is 
that the programs may generate more accurate emissions data, potentially 
making any national system adopted thereafter more environmentally 
effective.117  Obtaining accurate emissions data is a particular challenge for 
China given its wide variation in economic structure, growth rates, energy 
consumption, and carbon intensities, especially when coupled with China’s 
lack of reliable historic emissions data.118  China has not mandated a unified 
methodology to account and report emissions, which may make it difficult 
                                                      
113  Lohmann, supra note 72, at 90 (observing that “[p]oliticians like to say that ‘market approaches’ 
like emissions trading will prevent the pain of other kinds of regulation”); Press Release, Greg Combet AM 
MP, Minister for Climate Change and Energy Efficiency: Korea Legislates for Emissions Trading by 2015, 
(May 3, 2012), available at  http://www.climatechange.gov.au/ministers/hon-greg-combet-am-mp/media-
release/korea-legislates-emissions-trading-2015 (stating that “[t]here is growing acceptance that . . . 
emissions trading schemes and carbon prices are the cheapest and most efficient way of reducing 
emissions”). 
114  Richard G. Newell et al., Carbon Markets 15 Years after Kyoto: Lessons Learned, New 
Challenges, 27  J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 123, 128 (2013). 
115  Id. 
116  Ewa Krukowska, EU Carbon Permits ‘Worthless’ Without Change of Rules, UBS Says, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-21/eu-carbon-permits-worthless-
without-change-of-rules-ubs-says.html. 
117  GUOYI HAN, ET AL., FORES STUDY, CHINA’S CARBON EMISSION TRADING AN OVERVIEW OF 
CURRENT DEVELOPMENT xxi, 42 (2012), available at http://www.sei-international.org/mediamanager/ 
documents/Publications/china-cluster/SEI-FORES-2012-China-Carbon-Emissions.pdf. 
118  Id. 
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for pilots to transition to a national system.119  There are also concerns that 
pilots have not put in place stringent data-quality requirements, and that the 
economic data on which the emissions-intensity caps are based could be 
manipulated, undermining the pilots’ stringency.120 
Unfortunately, the demand for emissions trading systems has 
surpassed measurement and monitoring capabilities.  This phenomenon is 
partially explained by the fact that carbon emissions trading systems were 
translated from the United States sulfur dioxide emissions context to global 
carbon dioxide emissions.121  These are very distinct contexts—for example, 
merely stabilizing sulfur dioxide emissions prevents acid rain,122 whereas 
only absolute reductions of carbon dioxide emissions can counteract climate 
change.123  Moreover, there is no known means of reducing carbon dioxide 
emissions apart from refraining from combusting fossil fuels.124  Absent a 
quick technological fix,125 transitioning to a low carbon society requires 
radical innovation and structural economic changes.126   
The greatest difference between applying an emissions trading system 
in the carbon dioxide context rather than the sulfur dioxide context is 
coverage.  The sulfur dioxide market in the United States consisted of 
roughly 500 large, similar, stationary, and easily monitored sources; in 
contrast, the global carbon dioxide market is hundreds of millions of diverse, 
individual sources that may be impossible to monitor directly.127  This makes 
the task of administering a carbon market over an environmentally 
significant percentage of a country’s emissions formidable, particularly for 
countries that lack the technical and institutional capability to quantify and 
monitor industrial greenhouse gas emissions precisely and regularly. 128  
Consequently, emerging carbon emissions trading systems rely heavily on 
                                                      
119 Ranping Song, Inside China’s Emissions Trading Scheme: First Steps and the Road Ahead, 
WORLD RES. INST. (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.wri.org/blog/inside-china’s-emissions-trading-scheme-
first-steps-and-road-ahead (explaining that China has not mandated a unified monitoring, reporting, or 
verification method during the pilot phase). 
120  Id. 
121  Gilbertson & Reyes, supra note 85, at 19-21; Ghosh & Gray, supra note 70, at 15.  
122  Some critics question whether emissions trading was solely responsible for the clean-up of sulfur 
dioxide emissions in the United States.  See Gilbertson & Reyes, supra note 85, at 20; Jonathan Remy Nash, 
Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution Allowances and the ‘Polluter Pays’ Principle, 24 
HARV. ENVT’L L. REV. 465, 492 (2000). 
123  Ghosh & Gray, supra note 70, at 15. 
124  Id. 
125  Id. 
126  Splash & Lo, supra note 75, at 71; Anderson & Bows, supra note 82; Lohmann, supra note 72, at 
330-31. 
127  Ghosh & Gray, supra note 70, at 15-16. 
128  See, e.g., Lohmann, supra note 72, at 98. 
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industry reporting rather than solely on impartial authorities129 and tend to 
limit coverage to large, immobile emitters such as power generators.130  
Both the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme and South Korea’s 
pending emissions trading system have comparatively broad coverage, in 
that they regulate emissions from agriculture and forestry.131   Because 
carbon dioxide is not the dominant greenhouse gas emission in New 
Zealand, regulation of deforestation and agricultural emissions such as 
methane and nitrous oxide is essential for New Zealand’s emissions trading 
system to be environmentally effective.132  This breadth of coverage makes 
monitoring, reporting, and verification of compliance more challenging.   
New Zealand adapted the 2002 Climate Change Response Act’s 
electronic registry, which was established to track Kyoto units and emissions 
allocations, to serve as the national reporting and recording structure.133  
Like other emerging emissions trading systems, this structure is highly 
dependent on self-assessment and self-reporting,134 which creates a risk that 
regulated entities will misrepresent data.135  For example, emissions permits 
                                                      
129  See, e.g., Moyes, supra note 94, at 948 (citing T. H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 1, 166 (2006)) (observing that virtually all systems rely on self-reporting 
coupled with external oversight out of necessity). 
130  See infra Part III.B.1.  South Korea is somewhat unique in that it has a company-level threshold 
for receiving a mandatory cap as opposed to a facility or building-level threshold, resulting in somewhat 
broader coverage than other emissions trading systems.  SOPHER & MANSELL, supra note 9, at 5.  
131  Moyes, supra note 94, at 913-14; NORTON ROSE, ASIA PACIFIC CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY SERIES: 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA 2 (May 2011), http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/asia-pacific-climate-change-
policy-series-republic-of-korea-52311.pdf.  South Korea’s trial emissions trading scheme, the Target 
Management Scheme, includes forestry and agriculture as well.  Id.  
132  Agriculture accounted for 47.19% of New Zealand’s greenhouse gas emissions in 2011; energy 
only accounted for 42.58%.  UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE SECRETARIAT, SUMMARY OF GHG 
EMISSIONS FOR NEW ZEALAND 2, available at https://unfccc.int/files/ghg_emissions_data/application/pdf/ 
nzl_ghg_profile.pdf.  By comparison, energy as a percentage of total emission accounted for 76.42% in 
Australia, 77.25% in China, 91.32% in Japan, and 83.47% in South Korea that same year.  See UNITED 
NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE SECRETARIAT, GHG EMISSION PROFILES FOR ANNEX 1 PARTIES AND MAJOR 
GROUPS, available at http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/ghg_profiles/items/4625.php; UNITED 
NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE SECRETARIAT, GHG EMISSION PROFILES FOR NON-ANNEX 1 PARTIES, available 
at http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/ghg_profiles/items/4626.php. 
133  MINISTRY FOR THE ENV’T, THE FRAMEWORK FOR A NEW ZEALAND EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: 
4 CORE DESIGN FEATURES CONTINUED, available at http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/climate/ 
framework-emissions-trading-scheme-sep07/html/page6a.html. 
134  Moyes, supra note 94, at 948-49. 
135  Also, private carbon consultancies, private auditors, and rating agencies that help design, validate, 
verify, and certify greenhouse gas emissions reductions and projects may “have little incentive to question 
the effectiveness of the carbon projects they work on, since to do so would be to jeopardise [sic] their 
chances of getting future work.”  Lohmann, supra note 72, at 61 (describing controversies surrounding 
validators of United Nations CDM projects and the problem of conflicts of interest in international climate 
politics); see also MICHAEL GILLENWATER & STEPHEN SERES, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, 
THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM: A REVIEW OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL OFFSET PROGRAM 24-25 
(2011), available at http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/clean-development-mechanism-review-of-first-
international-offset-program.pdf (describing structural problems within the CDM project auditing process, 
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for the EU ETS were also initially based on estimates prepared by 
corporations themselves, resulting in permit allocation that exceeded carbon 
emissions by 50% in some industries.136  While this risk is likely not unique 
to emissions trading systems, it is amplified in the emissions trading context 
because the resulting credits or offsets can be sold for a profit to other 
emitters who then use those credits to offset their emissions.   
Further, emissions from livestock, synthetic fertilizer, and 
deforestation pose unique obstacles to gathering emissions data.  Unlike 
emissions from a single point source, such as a power generation facility, 
agricultural emissions from a single farm are strongly affected by weather 
variations and natural landscapes.137  There is significant uncertainty in 
calculating agricultural emissions because they are often the product of 
unpredictable microbial processes.138  This uncertainty makes it difficult for 
countries to set a meaningful national cap, allocate an appropriate number of 
allowances, and monitor compliance.139  Without an accurate measurement 
of these emissions, New Zealand resorted to using proxy estimates, such as 
emissions per number of livestock animals, amount of farm productivity, or 
quantity of fertilizer purchased—proxies that are not particularly accurate.140    
Another challenge is measuring carbon removal by the biosphere.  In 
2008, New Zealand’s emissions trading system phased in the forestry sector 
and recognized “carbon sequestration” and “sinks.”141  Landowners are 
granted emissions reduction credits for forestry activities that lead to the 
removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and, conversely, are held 
liable for deforestation and practices that release carbon dioxide. 142 
Australia,143 China,144 and Japan,145 similar to New Zealand, allow carbon 
                                                                                                                                                                 
such as the fact that auditors are paid by project developers, creating “the potential for conflicts of interest,” 
and the fact that the demand for project auditing exceeds the capacity of auditing firms, which “can lead to 
less than high quality auditing” as “audit firms attempt to finish projects quickly in order to handle the 
growing backlog”). 
136  DEL WESTON, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GLOBAL WARMING: THE TERMINAL CRISIS 43 (2014). 
137  Stephen Russell, Managing GHG Emissions from Agriculture: A Unique but Solvable Challenge, 
WORLD RES. INST. (May 14, 2012), http://www.wri.org/blog/managing-ghg-emissions-agriculture-unique-
solvable-challenge. 
138  Id. 
139  See Newell et al., supra note 114; Moyes, supra note 94. 
140  Moyes, supra note 94, at 957. 
141  MINISTRY FOR THE ENV’T, supra note 133. 
142  Id. 
143  Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.), available at 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2011A00101.  For a description of eligible projects, see Carbon 
Farming Initiative: Activities-eligible and excluded, DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, 
http://www.climatechange.gov.au/reducing-carbon/carbon-farming-initiative/activities-eligible-and-
excluded (last visited May 8, 2014). 
144  Ling Ma, Guangdong Calls for More Forest Carbon Sink Projects, ICIS (Dec. 20, 2013), 
http://www.icis.com/resources/news/2013/12/20/9737769/guangdong-calls-for-more-forest-carbon-sink-
JUNE 2014  REPEATING THE FAILURES OF CARBON TRADING 777 
sinks to generate emissions credits, and South Korea is moving in that 
direction.146  However, measuring the capacity of a particular forest to 
sequester carbon dioxide entails a high margin of error.147  It is difficult for 
regulators to determine when to require liable entities to report changes in 
stored carbon and in what quantities because carbon accumulates in the 
forest and soil slowly.148  Finally, testing for stored carbon dioxide is 
expensive.149   
Beyond these significant verification issues, carbon sinks are based on 
the flawed assumption that stored, biotic carbon 150  is equivalent to 
reductions in fossil carbon emissions.151  Although carbon dioxide emissions 
stay in the atmosphere for centuries, 152  carbon exchanged from the 
atmosphere to the biosphere is easily reversible—for instance, a tree 
plantation designed to store carbon might burn in wildfire, or be turned into 
paper or furniture that decomposes in a landfill.153  In other words, “one 
                                                                                                                                                                 
projects/; NAT’L DEV. AND REFORM COMM’N, CHINA’S POLICIES AND ACTIONS FOR ADDRESSING CLIMATE 
CHANGE 10, 23-24, 40 (2013), available at http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201311/P0201311086115330 
42884.pdf. 
145  See generally MINISTRY OF THE ENV’T, REVIEW OF THE OFFSET CREDIT (J-VER) SCHEME (2008-
2013) (2013), available at http://www.j-ver.go.jp/document/e/j-ver_generalization_eng.pdf; MINISTRY OF 
ECON., TRADE & INDUS., J-CREDIT SCHEME 10 (2013), available at 
http://www.japancredit.go.jp/pdf/english/credit_english_001_2.pdf. 
146  The Act on Maintenance and Promotion of Carbon Sinks was approved in March 2013—this 
called for a forest carbon offset registry to enable forest preservation to generate offset credits under their 
emissions trading system.  Introduction: Forest Carbon Center, FOREST CARBON CTR., 
http://carbon.kgpa.or.kr/flow/?ref=menu/view.emt&menu_table=m1_00&menu_idx=010000 (last visited 
May 8, 2014); see also Act on the Allocation and Trading of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Permits 
(promulgated by the Nat’l Assemb. on May 14, 2012, effective Nov. 15, 2012) arts. 29, 30 (S. Kor.). 
147 Moyes, supra note 94, at 960.  Estimates of carbon sequestration rates in China’s forests differ by 
up to 89%, depending on the measuring methodology.  Lohmann, supra note 72, at 155. 
148  Russell, supra note 137.  
149  Di Martin, Confidence in Soil Carbon Eroding, ABC NEWS (Feb. 21, 2013) 
http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/backgroundbriefing/the-carbon-conundrum/4532742. 
150  Carbon stored in several major sinks: “(a) as organic molecules in living and dead organisms 
found in the biosphere; (b) as the gas carbon dioxide in the atmosphere; (c) as organic matter in soils; (d) in 
the lithosphere as fossil fuels and sedimentary rock deposits such as limestone, dolomite and chalk; and (e) 
in the oceans as dissolved atmospheric carbon dioxide and as calcium carbonate shells in marine 
organisms.” Michael Pidwirny, Carbon Cycle, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EARTH (May 7, 2012), 
http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/150923/. 
151  Lohmann, supra note 72, at 154. 
152  Mason Inman, Carbon is Forever, NATURE (Nov. 20, 2008), http://www.nature.com/climate/2008/ 
0812/full/climate.2008.122.html (noting that it is difficult to estimate the lifetime of atmospheric carbon 
dioxide because it gets absorbed by a variety of processes, some of which take a few years, others a few 
hundreds of years, and still others a few thousands of years.  In human terms, this means that carbon 
dioxide emissions and their warming effects essentially last forever.  Additionally, a percentage of carbon 
dioxide stays in the atmosphere permanently or is re-released.). 
153  Lohmann, supra note 72, at 155. 
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[ton] of carbon in a tree is climatically not the same as one [ton] of carbon in 
a deep coal deposit.”154   
Despite claims to the contrary, emissions trading systems are 
inefficient.  Obtaining accurate data on emissions and sinks is key.  Yet 
verifying carbon sinks entails frequent and expensive testing, the 
unreliability of which could result in costly errors, such as over-allocation of 
permits.  Due to the penchant of carbon dioxide to be re-released from the 
biosphere to the atmosphere, substantial measures are needed to ensure sinks 
are permanent.  Inadequate mechanisms for measuring, monitoring, and 
verifying emissions also create opportunities for error and abuse, making 
enforcement difficult and necessitating substantial governmental 
oversight.155  These inefficiencies would be less concerning if emissions 
trading systems successfully reduced carbon dioxide emissions.  As the next 
section explains, they do not. 
B. Emissions Trading on the Pacific Rim Will Likely Not Reduce 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
 The emissions trading systems adopted by these Pacific Rim countries 
will likely fail to reduce emissions and reverse climate change.  Such 
systems are ineffective because 1) they are poorly suited to regulating the 
many, diverse sources of carbon dioxide emissions, and 2) the decisions to 
freely allocate allowances and permit the use of offsets will likely result in 
over-allocation and an increase, not a decrease, in emissions.  Rather, these 
emissions trading systems will legitimize the continued use of fossil fuels 
and create new sources of profit for the fossil fuel industry. 
                                                      
154  Id. 
155  See, e.g., Stefano Valentino, Carbon Trading: Why ‘Good’ Companies Embrace ‘Bad’ Credits, 
THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2012/0423/Carbon-
trading-Why-good-companies-embrace-bad-credits (describing how the Kyoto Protocol carbon credit 
system incentivized a number of manufacturers to intentionally produce far more HFC-23 emissions than 
necessary in order to later reduce those emissions and sell the resulting credits for profit.  Consequently, 
these emitters profited by accelerating global warming.  Although EU ETS ultimately banned these CERs, 
industries lobbied for an extension, and the ban was delayed until May 1, 2013.); GILLENWATER & SERES, 
supra note 135, at 18-19 (explaining how the initial CDM program had neither the procedures nor 
resources to thoroughly review all projects and issued little guidance on the concept of “additionality.”  The 
CDM has since put in place detailed methods and requirements, added new layers of audit and review, and 
increased staff.). 
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1. Emissions Trading Systems on the Pacific Rim Provide Incomplete 
Coverage of Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Emissions trading cannot adequately regulate the numerous sources of 
greenhouse gasses.  Nearly half of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions, or 
roughly 45.6%, originate from the energy sector and industry.156   The 
remaining 54.4% comes from various sectors, including transportation, 
livestock, agriculture, forestry, residential and commercial buildings, and 
waste.157  Some of these sectors pose significant challenges to designing and 
administering a comprehensive emissions trading system.  For example, in 
the personal transportation sector, emissions trading systems have higher 
transaction costs are less effective than vehicle emissions standards, in part 
because it is hard to verify the actual emissions of automobiles during their 
use.158  In the agricultural sector, emissions from a single farm can fluctuate 
widely over time and are difficult to measure.159   
Consequently, most emissions systems are limited to large, immobile 
emitters in the stationary energy and non-energy industrial sectors, which 
leaves unregulated significant sources of greenhouse gas emissions.   For 
example, China’s pilot projects cover large immobile sources from various 
industries.160  Within these regulated industries, only facilities that reach an 
emissions threshold are required to surrender emissions allowances.161  Such 
thresholds may reduce administrative costs, but undermine the system’s 
environmental effectiveness because not all sources of carbon dioxide are 
                                                      
156  UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, THE EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2012 11 (2012), available at 
http://www.unep.org/pdf/2012gapreport.pdf (using emissions data from 2010). 
157  Id. 
158 Why Emissions Trading is More Effective than Command and Control, INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING 
ASS’N, http://www.ieta.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=418:why-emissions-trading-
is-more-effective-than-command-and-control&catid=54:3-minute-briefing&Itemid=135 (last visited Apr. 
29, 2014). 
159  See infra Part III.A.2. 
160  SWARTZ, supra note 103, at 4 (including iron and steel, chemicals, cement, electricity, heat, 
petrochemical, power, oil and gas mining, construction, and public buildings). 
161  This emissions threshold ranges from companies that emit more than 60,000 tons of coal 
consumption for major sectors in the year 2010 or 2011 in Hubei province, to 20,000 tons per year for 
major sectors in 2010 or 2011 in Shanghai and 5,000 tons per year in Shenzhen.  Id. 
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capped.162  Similar limitations can be found in the other four experiments in 
Australia,163 Japan,164 New Zealand,165 and South Korea.166   
As explained in Part III.A.2, New Zealand and South Korea are 
exceptions to the narrow sectoral coverage as they intend to regulate a wide 
array of sectors, including agriculture, waste, forestry, fishing, and 
transportation.167  The challenges of accurately measuring, monitoring, and 
verifying emissions and sinks in the agriculture and forestry sectors makes it 
difficult to develop environmentally effective caps, allocate permits, and 
enforce compliance.168  In 2012, the New Zealand legislature postponed the 
surrender obligations for biological emissions from agriculture indefinitely, 
citing the lack of economically viable and practical technologies for farmers 
                                                      
162  Beijing’s system is expected to cover only 40-50% of total emissions in Beijing; Tianjin’s is 
expected to cover slightly more, or 60% of Tianjin’s emissions, and Chongqing’s is expected to cover 
slightly less, or 35-45% of Chongqing’s emissions.  Id.; Beijing Launches Carbon Emissions Trading, 
XINHUA (Nov. 28, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/sci/2013-11/28/c_132926353.htm.  Shenzhen 
covers just 38% of the city’s emissions.  China “Launches its First Carbon Trading Scheme,” PHYS.ORG 
(June 18, 2013), http://phys.org/news/2013-06-china-carbon-scheme.html#inlRlv. 
163  Australia’s Carbon Pricing Mechanism requires any facility that emits above an annual threshold 
of 25,000 tons of carbon dioxide to surrender emission permits to the government.  Explanatory 
Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth) 33 (Austl.).  In 2012, this system covered 377 entities, or 60% 
of Australia’s emissions.  Id. at 45; TALBERG & SWOBODA, supra note 100, at 11.  This excludes the 
agricultural and transport sectors, businesses, households, and light commercial vehicles; the transport 
sector is partially covered through a carbon price and fuel excise tax on fuel—excluding fuels used for light 
commercial transport, households, agriculture, forestry, and fisheries.  Id. at 34; PETER SOPHER & 
ANTHONY MANSELL, ENVTL. DEF. FUND & INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING ASS’N, AUSTRALIA, THE WORLD’S 
MARKETS: A CASE STUDY GUIDE TO EMISSIONS TRADING 3 (2013), available at 
http://www.ieta.org/assets/Reports/EmissionsTradingAroundTheWorld/edf_ieta_australia_case_study_ 
september_2013.pdf.   
164  Tokyo’s municipal-level emissions trading system only covers companies that use fuels, heat, and 
electricity in excess of 1500 kiloliters of crude oil equivalent per year, and it covers only about twenty 20% 
of Tokyo’s emissions, or 1% of Japan’s national emissions.  TALBERG & SWOBODA, supra note 100, at 19; 
PETER SOPHER & ANTHONY MANSELL, ENVTL. DEF. FUND & INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING ASS’N, JAPAN, THE 
WORLD’S MARKETS: A CASE STUDY GUIDE TO EMISSIONS TRADING 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.ieta.org/assets/Reports/EmissionsTradingAroundTheWorld/edf_ieta_ japan_case_study_ 
september_2013.pdf.  
165  Participation in the New Zealand system is mandatory for individual installations that exceed 
sector-specific emissions thresholds, and for liquid fossil fuel refiners who refine more than 50,000 liters.  
PETER SOPHER & ANTHONY MANSELL, ENVTL. DEF. FUND & INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING ASS’N, NEW 
ZEALAND, THE WORLD’S MARKETS: A CASE STUDY GUIDE TO EMISSIONS TRADING 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.ieta.org/assets/Reports/EmissionsTradingAroundTheWorld/edf_ieta_new_zealand_case_study_
september_2013.pdf.   
166  In South Korea, compliance is mandatory for companies or workplaces that meet the emissions 
threshold (an annual discharge of over 125,000 tCO2e for companies or over 25,000 tCO2e for workplaces).  
SOPHER & MANSELL, supra note 9, at 2-3.  South Korea’s trial emissions trading system covers about 60% 
of the country’s annual greenhouse gas emissions.  South Korean Emissions 31% Higher Than Government 
Forecast, THOMSON REUTERS (Feb. 12, 2014), https://www.pointcarbon.com/aboutus/ 
pressroom/pressreleases/1.4086316.  
167  See MINISTRY FOR THE ENV’T, supra note 133. 
168  See infra Part III.A.2. 
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to reduce emissions and trading partners’ lack of progress.169  Roughly half 
of New Zealand’s greenhouse gas emissions are now unregulated by the 
scheme,170 severely curtailing its environmental effectiveness.   
These emissions thresholds and limitations to particular emissions 
sectors are structural features that make emissions trading systems 
ineffective climate change policies.  However, these particular experiments 
have additional coverage limitations.  For example, partial geographic 
coverage is a separate issue in China, where most pilot programs are in the 
coastal cities and provinces of Eastern China.171  It is estimated that 80% of 
emissions related to items consumed in these coastal provinces and 
municipalities are released in less-developed provinces in central China.172  
Until a national system exists, the pilots may exacerbate emissions 
outsourcing within the country, without producing significant reductions in 
China’s overall emissions. 173   
Japan has huge gaps in coverage to the extent that their mandatory 
emissions trading systems are subnational only.174  Like the Kyoto Protocol, 
Japan’s national emissions trading program is entirely voluntary. 175  
Consequently, from 2005 to 2009, the Japan Voluntary Emissions Trading 
Scheme (“JVETS”) covered less than one percent of Japan’s industrial 
emissions, and less than one-third of participants adopted absolute targets.176  
                                                      
169  Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading and Other Matters) Amendment Act 2012 (N.Z.), 
available at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/bill/government/2012/0052/latest/versions.aspx, summarized at 
Legislative Changes to the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS), CLIMATE CHANGE INFO., 
NEW ZEALAND (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.climatechange.govt.nz/emissions-trading-scheme/ets-
amendments/; see also Cth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 Nov. 2012, 6449 (Hon. 
Tim Groser, Minister for Climate Change Issues) (Austl.), available at http://www.parliament.nz/en-
nz/pb/debates/debates/50HansD_20121108_00000016/climate-change-response-emissions-trading-and-
other-matters. 
170  See UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE SECRETARIAT supra note 132. 
171  See generally SWARTZ, supra note 103. 
172  China is Outsourcing Carbon Within its Own Borders, PHYS.ORG (June 10, 2013), 
http://phys.org/news/2013-06-china-outsourcing-carbon-borders.html#inlRlv. 
173  Id.; see also TALBERG & SWOBODA, supra note 100, at 21-22 (noting the possibility that by 
establishing pilots in only a handful of provinces, industry will be tempted to relocate to unaffected 
provinces). 
174  Japan’s proposals for a nation-wide carbon emission trading scheme or tax have succumbed to 
substantial political resistance.  Leo Shanahan, Japan’s Energy Crisis Puts ETS Launch on Ice, THE 
AUSTRALIAN (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/climate/japans-energy-
crisis-puts-ets-launch-on-ice/story-e6frg6xf-1226284525560.  Consequently, the emissions trading schemes 
implemented to meet Japan’s international targets are sub-national in scope or else voluntary in nature.  See 
Sven Rudolph & Friedrich Schneider, Did the Japanese Patient Follow the Doctor’s Orders? Mostly no! A 
Public Choice Analysis of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Schemes in Japan Before and After the 
Earthquake 5-6, (CESifo Working Paper: Resource and Environment Economics, No. 3639, 2011), 
available at https://www.econstor.eu/dspace/bitstream/10419/52425/1/672560097.pdf, at 5-6; TALBERG & 
SWOBODA, supra note 100, at 19. 
175  See generally SOPHER & MANSELL, supra note 164. 
176  Id. at 3-4.  
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The Integrated Domestic Emissions Trading Market that succeeded this 
national scheme in 2008 is still voluntary, at its height covering 70% of 
Japan’s industrial firms. 177   Reported emissions reductions are not 
necessarily reliable because only a few participants accepted external 
monitoring or verification.178  Participants could borrow allowances or invest 
in project-based Kyoto Protocol mechanisms to generate credits, which 
saved them from non-compliance with their own targets.179  Additionally, 
participants that failed to meet their targets faced nominal penalties.180  
Japan’s only mandatory emissions trading schemes are at the municipal and 
regional levels.181 
The emissions trading systems along the Pacific Rim regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions incompletely.  Some are geographically limited, 
others cover only a few emissions sectors, and all are limited to large, 
generally fixed sources of emissions.  This partial coverage limits their 
ability to meaningfully reduce emissions because not all emitters are 
required to make cuts.   
 
2.  The Decision to Freely Allocate Allowances and Permit the Use of 
Offsets Will Likely Result in Over-allocation and an Increase of 
Emissions 
 
Emissions trading systems have not reduced emissions as promised.182  
Their effectiveness depends on lowering the total allowable emissions over 
time, forcing emitters to either purchase increasingly scarce and thus 
expensive emission rights, reduce emissions through investment in lower 
emission technology or carbon capture and storage, or pay a penalty for 
noncompliance. 183   As a result, emissions trading systems face severe 
                                                      
177  Rudolph & Schneider, supra note 174, at 6-8. 
178  Id. 
179  Id. at 7-8. 
180  Randall S. Jones & Byungseo Yoo, Improving the Policy Framework in Japan to Address Climate 
Change 140 (OECD Economic Surveys, Working Paper No. 740, 2009). 
181  Tokyo launched a mandatory, municipal emissions trading scheme in April 2010; Saitama, 
Japan’s fifth most populous prefecture, launched a nearly identical emissions trading system in 2011.  
TALBERG & SWOBODA, supra note 100, at 19-20. 
182  See Andrew et al., supra note 78, at 615 (observing that “the theory of carbon markets is based on 
the idea that a deregulated market will be the most efficient approach to carbon minimization because it is 
claimed that by eliminating ‘regulatory interventions such as carbon taxes or precise standards for 
polluters . . . the market will seek out the most efficient means of achieving the same emissions reduction 
goals.’ . . . Though the evidence so far indicates that the ambitions of neoliberal, market oriented carbon 
policy have remained unfulfilled. . . Therefore, relying on an ETS to reduce carbon pollution is either naïve, 
or this was never the primary purpose.”). 
183  DEATHERAGE, supra note 31, at 20 (observing that emissions reductions imposed on industry must 
be real, significant, and continue to decrease over time). 
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opposition, particularly from carbon intensive industries and industries 
exposed to international competition with countries that lack or have less 
stringent climate laws.184  Unfortunately, this opposition frequently results in 
concessions to emitters, including the adoption of low national or sectoral 
emission reduction targets, free allocation of emission allowances, the use of 
offsets, and expanded state aid.185  These concessions are environmentally 
harmful because they allow regulated entities to ostensibly comply with 
emissions caps while maintaining or increasing their emissions.  As 
explained below, such concessions are characteristic of the emissions trading 
systems adopted in Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. 
The free allocation of allowances, undermines emissions trading 
systems by reducing the incentive for regulated entities to reduce emissions 
and creating windfall profits for emitters.  Emissions allowances are 
valuable property rights that, counterintuitively, are awarded to the most 
carbon intensive industries. 186   They derive their value from allowing 
holders to avoid cutting emissions. 187   When emission allowances are 
auctioned, the price of reducing emissions is born by the regulated industry 
and the government earns revenue that may be put to other uses. 188  
Conversely, when emission allowances are allocated free of cost, the 
regulated entities gain a valuable property interest that may be sold for a 
profit and the cost of achieving emissions reductions is shifted from the 
regulated industry to the taxpayer.189  Thus free allocation undercuts the 
ability of an emissions trading system to incentivize emissions cuts and asks 
taxpayers to subsidize emissions-intensive industries.190 
Over-allocation undermines emissions trading systems.  Theoretically, 
a gradually declining emissions cap, regardless of the price of allowances, 
compels regulated entities to reduce emissions.191  Yet, emissions trading 
                                                      
184 Harro van Asselt & Thomas Brewer, Addressing Competitiveness and Leakage Concerns in 
Climate Policy: An Analysis of Border Adjustment Measures in the US and the EU, 38 ENERGY POL. 42 
(2009). 
185  See, e.g., NORTON ROSE, supra note 131, at 1; Sangim Han, South Korean Parliament Approves 
Carbon Trading System, BLOOMBERG (May 2, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
2012-05-02/south-korean-parliament-approves-carbon-trading-system.html. 
186  See Gilbertson & Reyes, supra note 85, at 18; Lohmann, supra note 72 at 344. 
187  DEATHERAGE, supra note 31, at 31. 
188  Id. at 31-32. 
189  Under the EU ETS, the German power company, RWE, is estimated to have earned €1.8 billion in 
a year by charging customers for permits it received for free. Splash & Lo, supra note 75, at 75 (arguing 
that free allocation of permits creates “incentive to pass on the cost to consumers to reap windfall profits.  
Even if an industry receives emissions permits free of charge, the price of its products typically rise to 
reflect the value of the permits. . . because free permits have an opportunity cost: excess permits can be 
sold in the market.”). 
190  See id. 
191  See DEATHERAGE, supra note 31, at 20. 
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systems are vulnerable to over-allocation,192 meaning that the emissions cap 
is set higher than actual emissions,193 possibly in response to political 
pressure for more free allowances or as a result of inaccurate and incomplete 
emissions data or projections.  When allowances are over-allocated, there is 
no scarcity of allowances and regulated entities have enough permits to 
cover their current emissions, if not further emissions, meaning there is no 
incentive for regulated entities to cut emissions.194  Essentially, the emissions 
trading system begins to subsidize emissions intensive industries, 195 
encouraging investment in, and perpetuating reliance upon, fossil fuels. 
The use of offsets allows regulated entities to reduce emissions from 
activities outside the scope of the emissions trading system to generate 
emissions reduction credits—credits that may be used to meet their own 
emissions reduction requirements. 196   Offsets theoretically help achieve 
compliance at the lowest possible cost197—if carbon dioxide emissions are 
equivalent across industries and regions, offsets allow emissions reductions 
                                                      
192  Largely due to free allocation of permits.  See Alex Scott, EU Carbon Emission Trading Scheme 
In Freefall, C&EN (Feb. 18, 2013), http://cen.acs.org/articles/91/i7/EU-Carbon-Emissions-Trading-
Scheme.html (explaining that in the EU ETS, the high number of exemptions for energy-intensive 
industries, plus the economic recession that suppressed manufacturing, created a huge oversupply of carbon 
emissions allowances.  In 2013, just over 50% of allowances were auctioned—the remainder were freely 
allocated.  Without intervention, the scheme will result in zero emissions reductions by 2020). 
193  In other words, “there is a fundamental lack of scarcity of allowances.”  Lesley K. McAllister, The 
Overallocation Problem in Cap-And-Trade: Moving Toward Stringency, 34 COLUMBIA J. OF ENVT’L L. 395, 
411 (2009). 
194  Andrew et al., supra note 78, at 615 (attributing the failure of the First Phase of the EU ETS to an 
oversupply of permits by the regulatory authorities); Will Nichols, EU Carbon Markets Set “To Be 
Oversupplied until 2027,” BUSINESSGREEN (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/ 
2295736/eu-carbon-markets-set-to-be-oversupplied-until-2027 (analysts predict that the 2.5 billion excess 
carbon credits at the start of Phase III of the EU ETS will not be fully eroded until the mid-2020s with more 
aggressive climate policies); Damian Carrington, EU Emissions Trading Scheme “Set to Cancel Out 
Renewable Energy Gains,” THE GUARDIAN (June 25, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
environment/2013/jun/25/eu-emissions-trading-scheme-energy 
(finding huge oversupplies of carbon pollution permits in the EU ETS, many of which “are being banked to 
enable emissions after 2020, when efforts to tackle global warming should be intensifying.”  The price of 
carbon permits was as low as €4.13 in July 2013, far below the €30 analysts say is needed to effectively 
reduce emissions.); Backloading Inadequate to Revitalize EU ETS, FORTUM (Nov. 8, 2013), 
http://www.fortum.com/en/mediaroom/pages/fortum-backloading-inadequate-to-revitalise-eu-emissions-
trading.aspx (arguing that reducing the oversupply that has led to the plummeting of price of emissions 
allowances in the EU ETS will require “backloading,” or temporarily withdrawing 900 million allowances 
from the market in 2013-2015 and postponing the auctioning of them until 2019-2020). 
195 Keating, supra note 78 (according to Bloomberg New Energy Finance, “the steel, cement, refining, 
lime, glass, ceramics, and pulp sectors all generated a profit” within the European Union’s emissions 
trading scheme by being over-allocated.  For example, the steel sector was given 1.2 million allowances for 
free over five years, and only 729,000 were used—which “translates to a theoretical profit of €1.5 million 
for the sector.”). 
196  DEATHERAGE, supra note 31, at 19. 
197  INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING ASS’N, supra note 157 (asserting that “cap-and-trade will deliver its 
environmental objective at the lowest cost to the economy”). 
JUNE 2014  REPEATING THE FAILURES OF CARBON TRADING 785 
to be made wherever they are the cheapest, or most efficient.  Offsets, 
however, compromise the environmental objectives.  If offsets are unlimited, 
or if limits are unenforced, then they enable regulated entities to pollute over 
the cap,198 meaning that the cap could steadily decline, but emissions could 
actually increase.  Thus, offsets exacerbate the effects of over-allocation. 199  
Even if the use of offsets is limited to a percentage of a regulated entity’s 
allowances, it is difficult to verify that offsets represent actual emission 
reductions.200  Assuming the integrity of offsets could be consistently and 
accurately verified, the cost of doing so cuts into the alleged efficiency of 
emissions trading systems.201   Finally, offsets directly and indirectly 202 
perpetuate reliance on fossil fuels, particularly in the most fossil-fuel 
intensive industries and countries203 where emissions reductions are arguably 
more urgent because of the greater cost. 
The emissions trading systems in Australia, China, Japan, New 
Zealand, and South Korea are flawed to the extent that they all freely 
allocate permits and sanction the use of offsets.  Both characteristics render 
the programs more vulnerable to over-allocation and effectively subsidize 
                                                      
198  CARBON TRADE WATCH, CARBON OFFSETS FACT SHEET 2 1 (Dec. 2009), available at 
http://www.carbontradewatch.org/downloads/publications/factsheet02-offsets.pdf. 
199  Keating, supra note 78 (observing that if international credits such as credits through the Kyoto 
Protocol’s CDM are considered, the EU ETS’s total credit surplus is almost two billion allowances, worth 
€7.3 billion in May 2013). 
200  See infra Part III.A.2; CARBON TRADE WATCH, supra note 197; Newell et al., supra note 114, at 
137; James Wright, Politicians Right to Rebuff Business Lobby’s Scheming, PRECARIOUS CLIMATE (Mar. 8, 
2013), http://precariousclimate.com/2013/03/08/politicians-right-aig-business-lobby-scheming/ (criticizing 
international offsets as “a breeding ground for creating accounting while preventing structural 
decarbonization of the Australian economy”). 
201  Newell et al., supra note 114, at 137 (to reduce emissions, “credits can only be given to projects 
(and for measurable reductions) that would not have occurred without the offset credit program.  At the 
same time, rigorous screening creates transaction costs that eat into potential cost savings.”). 
202  Indirectly because offsets compensate for continuing present carbon emissions; directly because 
the offset projects compensating for those emissions may actually be “supercritical” coal-fired power plants 
eligible for CDM credits.  Stephen Lacey, In The ‘Crazy’ World Of Carbon Finance, Coal Now Qualifies 
For Emission Reduction Credits, CLIMATE PROGRESS (Sept. 19, 2012), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/ 
2012/09/19/865471/in-the-crazy-world-of-carbon-finance-coal-now-qualifies-for-emission-reduction-
credits/# (observing that because new coal-fired power stations are eligible for CDM credits, “a coal-fired 
power plant in Europe could be “offset” by carbon credits . . . through another carbon-burning coal plant in 
India.”); Michael Lazarus & Chelsea Chandler, Coal Power in the CDM: Issues and Options (Stockholm 
Environment Institute, Working Paper 2011), available at http://sei-us.org/Publications_PDF/SEI-WP-
2011-02-Coal-in-CDM-ES.pdf (questioning whether the CDM should be used to support marginal 
improvements in coal emission rates when the vast majority of such projects would have proceeded with or 
without the CDM and lock in over 400 million tons per year in emissions). 
203  See CARBON TRADE WATCH, supra note 197 (arguing that offset projects enable continued 
pollution in industrialized countries and shift responsibility for emission reductions); Lohmann, supra note 
72, at 103-04 (arguing that “[i]nstead of encouraging the type of innovations, long-term investments and 
broad restructuring that are crucial to speeding the transition to a society that doesn’t use fossil fuels, 
[offsets discourage] them in favor of scattered stopgap measures that may ultimately be very costly.”). 
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fossil fuel use or at least reduce the incentive to cut emissions.  This prevents 
the systems from attaining meaningful emissions reductions. 
 
a.  These emissions trading systems are flawed to the extent that they 
freely allocate allowances 
 
When the Australian emission trading system began in 2012, Australia 
allocated free permits for emissions-intensive, trade-exposed activities for up 
to 94.5% of the industry baseline emissions intensity, or 66% for the less-
intensive and less-exposed industries.204  These baselines are drawn from 
historic emissions and production data submitted by the regulated entities 
themselves.205  Awarding free credits on the basis of data submitted by the 
regulated parties themselves increases the risk of over-allocation and little 
abatement.206  Also, these free permits essentially subsidize the largest 
emitters.   Apart from free allocation, Australia also awarded coal fired 
electricity generators assistance in free units and cash payments.207  Because 
the quantity of permits available for purchase is unlimited in Australia until 
June 2015 when an emissions cap is introduced, there is not an absolute limit 
on the quantity of emissions.208 
                                                      
204  TALBERG & SWOBODA, supra note 100, at 12; Emissions-Intensive Trade-Exposed: Eligibility, 
CLEAN ENERGY REGULATOR, http://ret.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/For-Industry/Emissions-Intensive-
Trade-Exposed/eligibility (last visited May 8, 2014) (defining emissions-intensive, trade-exposed activities 
and degrees of assistance); CLEAN ENERGY REGULATOR, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, GUIDE TO CARBON PRICE 
LIABILITY UNDER THE CLEAN ENERGY ACT 2011 16-17 (2012), available at 
http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/Carbon-Pricing-Mechanism/Fact-sheets-FAQs-and-guidelines/ 
Guidelines/Documents/Guide%20to%20Carbon%20Price%20Liability.pdf (describing financial assistance 
available to energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries under the Jobs and Competitiveness Program, 
and assistance to coal-fired generators under the Energy Security Fund, including cash payments and free 
allocations); Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth) 162 (Austl.) (noting an initial 
assistance of “94.5 per cent of the allocative baseline for activities that have an emissions intensity of at 
least 2,000 tonnes of CO2 e/million dollars of revenue or 6,000 tonnes of CO2 e/million dollars of value 
added in the specified assessment period; or 66 per cent of the allocative baseline for activities that have an 
emissions intensity between 1,000 tonnes CO2 e/million dollars of revenue and 1,999 tonnes of CO2 
e/million dollars of revenue, or between 3,000 tonnes of CO2 e/million dollars of value added and 5,999 
tonnes of CO2 e/million dollars of value added in the specified assessment period.”).  These rates of 
assistance are reduced by 1.3 % each year.  Id.  
205 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 204, at 163. 
206  Lohmann, supra note 72, at 98 (observing that in the past, when data on industrial emissions has 
been provided by polluting companies themselves rather than an impartial authority or measurement of 
actual emissions, there were large margins of error and chronic underreporting); see also Splash & Lo, 
supra note 75, at 73 (arguing that “this is exactly the situation arising under Phase I of the EU ETS where 
permits prices fell dramatically”). 
207  Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 204, at 182-83 (noting 41.705 million free carbon units 
annually over the years 2013-14 to 2016-17 and one billion in cash payments in the first compliance year). 
208  Splash & Lo, supra note 75, at 73.  Should the carbon pricing mechanism be repealed and 
replaced by the Direct Action policy, emissions reductions will be purchased through competitive 
government grants, and there will be no overall emissions cap or disincentive to continue emitting at the 
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China’s pilot programs allocate emissions permits primarily for free.  
Of the five programs already launched, Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and 
Tianjin allocate emissions permits for free.209  Thus far, Guangdong is the 
only pilot program that requires companies to buy a portion of their 
allowances through auction—three percent in 2013, and increasing to ten 
percent by 2015.210 Like Australia, the pilot programs’ emissions caps are 
not absolute, but rather intensity-based.211  Emissions intensity is the ratio of 
carbon dioxide emissions to some measure of economic output.212  Under 
intensity-based caps, absolute emissions may increase even as emissions 
intensity improves.213   
Japan lacks a mandatory, nationwide emissions trading scheme.214  
Japanese companies have participated voluntarily in JVETS, which 
distributed allowances freely from 2005 to 2009, and government subsidies 
were available to finance one third of a company’s abatement measures.215  
The Integrated Domestic Emissions Trading Market that succeeded this 
scheme in 2008 removed subsidies for abatement measures, but it remains 
voluntary and subsidizes polluters to the extent that they may choose 
between several free allowances to meet the target of their choice. 216  
                                                                                                                                                                 
same rate—rather, tax-payers will purchase abatement.  See generally LIBERAL PARTY OF AUSTRALIA, WE 
HAVE A PLAN FOR REAL ACTION: 10. REDUCE CARBON EMISSIONS, http://www.liberal.org.au/our-plan/ 
environment; Anthony Hobley, Repeal of the Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism, or a clever case of 
re-branding?, BUSINESSGREEN (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/opinion/ 
2293636/repeal-of-the-australian-carbon-pricing-mechanism-or-a-clever-case-of-rebranding; Lisa Caripis, 
The Coalition’s Climate Change Policy: It’s the Public, not Polluters, who Pay, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 19, 
2013) http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/20/coalition-climate-change-direct-action. 
209  SWARTZ, supra note 103, at 4, 25, 38, and 43; Shànghǎi shì rénmín zhèngfǔ guānyú běn shì 
kāizhǎn tàn páifàng jiāoyì shìdiǎn gōngzuò de shíshī yìjiàn (上海市人民政府关于本市开展碳排放交易试点工作的
实施意见) [Shanghai Municipal People’s Government to Carry out the Implementation of Views on the 
City’s Carbon Emissions Trading Pilot], http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node2314/node2319/ 
node12344/u26ai32789.html. 
210  Ranping Song & Hongpeng Lei, Emissions Trading in China: First Reports from the Field, 
WORLD RES. INST. (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.wri.org/blog/emissions-trading-china-first-reports-field. 
211  See, e.g., Shanghai Municipal People’s Government to Carry out the Implementation of Views on 
the City’s Carbon Emissions Trading Pilot, supra note 208.  
212  “Emissions Intensity”—Pollution by Any Other Name?, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, (Aug. 23, 
2005), http://www.nrdc.org/globalwarming/fintensity.asp. 
213  Id. 
214  In 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan promised to “reduce the political influence of large 
Japanese corporations and to establish an ambitious climate policy,” and the Basic Law on Global 
Warming Countermeasures, passed in May 2010, called for the creation of a national emissions trading 
system.  However, it proved impossible to overcome industry concerns over international competitiveness 
without meaningful international action on climate change, so the legislation lapsed and the Fukushima 
disaster sealed its fate.  Plans for a national, mandatory emissions trading system were formally abandoned 
in November 2012.  See TALBERG & SWOBODA, supra note 100, at 22; SOPHER & MANSELL, supra note 
163, at 7; Meltzer, supra note 6, at 1-3; Shanahan, supra note 174. 
215  Rudolph & Schneider, supra note 174, at 5-6. 
216  Id. at 6-7. 
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Tokyo’s mandatory municipal emissions trading system still allocates 
permits to emitters for free.217 
In New Zealand, the steady decline and low price of emissions units 
reflects the low constraints imposed by their emissions trading system.218  
Under “transitional measures” that were extended indefinitely in 2012,219 
participants may purchase carbon units from the government at a fixed price 
and those in the energy, industrial, and liquid fuel sectors need surrender 
only one credit for every two tons of emissions produced.220  Industries 
facing international competition, horticulture, and fishing receive up to 90% 
free allocation.221  In the industrial sector, the percentage allocated for free 
was initially 90% for highly emissions-intensive activities and 60% for 
moderately emissions-intensive activities.222  This free allocation for large 
emitters was set to decline by 1.3% per year starting in 2013,223 but the 2012 
amendment postponed these cuts indefinitely, “effectively lock[ing] in the 
ninety percent allocation subsidy.”224   
South Korea’s trial emissions trading system will transition to a 
national scheme in 2015, with significant concessions to emitters.225  At least 
95% of permits will be allocated for free in the first and second commitment 
periods, and at least five percent will be auctioned.226  This is similar to the 
                                                      
217  TALBERG & SWOBODA, supra note 100, at 19; BUREAU OF THE ENV’T, TOKYO METRO. GOV’T, 
TOKYO CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM: JAPAN’S FIRST MANDATORY EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME 19 (Mar. 
2010), available at http://www.kankyo.metro.tokyo.jp/en/attachement/Tokyo-cap_and_trade_program-
march_2010_TMG.pdf.  
218  Keys Defends NZ’s ETS Amid Criticism, FINANCIAL REV. (July 11, 2011), 
http://www.afr.com/p/national/politics/keys_defends_nz_ets_amid_criticism_9XA1ATGHI1GuFHtffxF1A
J (noting that when Australia announced a carbon tax/fixed-price period that would force Australian 
polluters to pay $23 per ton of CO2-e, New Zealand’s credit price was $9.77, and noting that Green Party 
leaders expressed concern over the cost of subsidizing carbon pollution); TALBERG & SWOBODA, supra 
note 100, at 13. 
219  TALBERG & SWOBODA, supra note 100, at 13. 
220  Id. at 12. 
221 Newell et al., supra note 114, at 130.  
222  SOPHER & MANSELL, supra note 164, at 3-4. 
223  Id. 
224  Addendum to the Submission on the Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading and Other 
Matters) Amendment Bill,  Submission to the Finance and Expenditure Committee, Dr. Jan Wright, Sept. 
2012, Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 5-6, available at http://www.pce.parliament.nz/ 
assets/Uploads/PCE-Submission-on-the-Climate-Change-Amendment-Bill.pdf (observing that under the 
original phase-out period, polluters would still be responsible for only half of their emissions by 2050; 
under the 2012 amendments, this phase-out is postponed indefinitely). 
225  South Korea initially announced an emissions trading bill in 2011 with significant concessions to 
industry, including free permit allocation and easing non-compliance penalties.  NORTON ROSE, supra note 
130, at 1.  Nevertheless, South Korea’s two largest business lobbies, the Federation of Korean Industries 
and Korea Chamber of Commerce & Industry, successfully lobbied to delay introduction of the emissions 
trading system for another four years—until 2015.  Sangim Han, supra note 185.  
226  Act on the Allocation and Trading of Greenhouse-Gas Emissions Permits, May 14, 2012, 
Addenda art. 2 (S. Kor.). 
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EU ETS’s ratio when it was launched in 2005.227  In reality, emitters will 
likely receive all of their allowances for free during the first commitment 
period, 2015 to 2017, and as much as 97% free from 2018 to 2020.228  
Moreover, the system will likely exempt certain key emissions-intensive and 
trade-exposed industries from the reduction in free allocations for the first 
two phases.229  Companies in energy-intensive and trade-exposed sectors 
will receive all of their allowances free.230 
Each of these emissions trading systems allocates the vast majority of 
permits to emitters for free.  This substantially diminishes the financial 
burden on emitters, giving them less incentive to reduce emissions.  The 
next section describes the use of offsets in these systems.  Offsets, combined 
with the free allocation, could mean that a majority of emitters could comply 
with the regulations without making a single emissions reduction. 
 
b.  These emissions trading systems are flawed to the extent that they 
permit the use of offsets 
 
Finally, because the emissions trading systems of Australia, China, 
Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea include offsets, these systems will 
likely be environmentally ineffective.  In Australia, domestic carbon credits 
may be used to meet five percent of a regulated entity’s compliance 
obligation during the fixed price period.231  After July 1, 2015, there are no 
limits imposed on the amount of domestic offsets used.232  Regulated entities 
cannot use internationally sourced credits during the fixed charge years,233 
                                                      
227  Tom Young, The Ultimate Guide to South Korea’s Cap-and-Trade Scheme, BUSINESSGREEN  
(Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/analysis/2044996/ultimate-guide-south-koreas-cap-
trade-scheme. The EU ETS is poised to become significantly more demanding with only 40% of permits 
allocated free of charge from 2013.  Id. 
228  MINISTRY OF ENV’T, ENVTL. REV. 2013, KOREA: ECOREA 30 (2013), available at 
http://eng.me.go.kr/eng/web/index.do?menuId=30&findDepth=1. 
229  Korea’s Emission Trading Scheme Receives Cabinet Approval, BAKER & MCKENZIE (Nov. 26, 
2012), http://bakerxchange.com/rv/ff000c93476c98a4f4e26731fb45a94f3e29f762. The concept of 
protecting “trade exposed” industries arose when countries contemplating climate legislation became 
concerned that industries with high compliance costs would be unable to compete in the international 
market against their foreign counterparts who had less stringent climate legislation.  See Emissions Trading 
and the WTO, INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING ASS’N, http://www.ieta.org/ 
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&catid=54:3-minute-briefing&id=206:emissions-trading-
and-the-wto (last visited May 8, 2014). 
230  SOPHER & MANSELL, supra note 9, at 3. 
231 Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) part 6, div. 3, subdiv. A §125(7) (Austl.); Explanatory Memorandum, 
supra note 204, at 117.  
232  House Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 204, at 117. 
233  Clean Energy Act 2011, supra note 231, at part 6 div. 1 §121. 
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but they may use the credits to meet up to 50% of their compliance 
obligation in the first five floating price years.234  
In China, regulated entities may use carbon credits, Chinese Certified 
Emission Reductions,235 to offset a limited portion of their compliance 
obligation.  All Chinese pilot programs have agreed to accept these credits, 
with limits. 236   China’s national emissions trading system will likely 
incorporate offsets, as well.237  
 Japan is heavily reliant on offsets, as opposed to emissions 
reductions, to meet its emissions targets, as demonstrated by the extensive 
incorporation of offsets in both its municipal and national emissions trading 
programs. Under the Tokyo Cap-and-Trade Program, small and midsized 
facilities can generate tradable offset credits, with no limit for offsetting.238  
Under JVETS, entities can also use CDM credits without limit, so long as 
they are not the “primary means” of achieving the pledged targets.239  The 
J-VER scheme, established in 2008, is a verification scheme for credits 
generated through the reduction or recapture of greenhouse gases carried out 
via domestic projects.240  This scheme and the domestic CDM system241 
were integrated into a new J-Credit Scheme.242  Projects are eligible under 
                                                      
234  Splash & Lo, supra note 75, at 74. 
235  Wēnshì qìtǐ zìyuàn jiǎnpái jiāoyì guǎnlǐ zànxíng bànfǎ (温室气体自愿减排交易管理暂行办法) [The 
Interim Regulation of Voluntary Greenhouse Gases Emission Trading in China] (promulgated by the 
National Development and Reform Commission July 2012), available at http://cdm.ccchina.gov.cn/ 
WebSite/CDM/UpFile/File2894.pdf (authorizing voluntary emission reductions from qualified projects to 
be traded as Certified Emission Reductions and used to offset compliance obligations.  One Certified 
Emission Reduction equals one ton of CO2e).  
236  SWARTZ, supra note 103, at 16.  Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Hubei, and Guangdong 
have limited or are expected to limit use of offsets to 10% of emissions reduction requirements.  Id. at 5; 
CARBON MARKET WATCH, CHINA’S PILOT EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEMS (NEWSLETTER #3) (May 30, 
2013), available at http://carbonmarketwatch.org/chinas-pilot-emissions-trading-systems/. 
237  See, e.g., NAT’L DEV. AND REFORM COMM’N, supra note 143. 
238 YUKO NISHIDA, BUREAU OF ENV’T, TOKYO METRO. GOV’T, TOKYO CAP AND TRADE PROGRAM & 
STRATEGIC REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 14, available at http://www.unep.org/ 
sbci/pdfs/Oct_symposium/Metropolitan's%20Tokyo's%20Cap%20and%20Trade%20Program_YN.pdf. 
239  JP-2: Japanese Voluntary Emissions Trading Scheme (JVETS), INDUS. EFFICIENCY POL. 
DATABASE, http://iepd.iipnetwork.org/policy/japanese-voluntary-emissions-trading-scheme-jvets. 
240  See generally MINISTRY OF THE ENV’T, OFFICE OF MKT. MECHANISMS, CLIMATE CHANGE POL. 
DIVISION, OFFSET CREDIT (J-VER) SCHEME (2011), available at 
http://www.env.go.jp/en/earth/ets/mkt_mech/j-ver_scheme.pdf (including reductions and forest sinks).  
This is a system utilizing the mechanism of carbon offsets, under which the amount of reduction/removal 
by sinks of greenhouse gas emissions carried out by domestic projects is certified as credits for offsetting. 
MINISTRY OF ECON., TRADE, AND INDUS., FINAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTION OF THE NEW CREDIT SYSTEM 
(2012), available at http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2012/0802_01.html. 
241 The domestic CDM system is a system whereby large enterprises provide technology and capital 
and validate the emissions reductions achieved through projects implemented by small and medium-sized 
enterprises in the agriculture, forestry and fisheries industries, the private sector (business and households), 
and the transportation sector.  Large enterprises in Japan use this system to meet their voluntary action plan 
targets.  MINISTRY OF ECON., TRADE, AND INDUS., supra note 239. 
242  Id. 
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the J-Credit scheme if they are implemented within Japan, satisfy 
additionality, and ensure permanency—a particular challenge for forestry 
credits.243  
Uniquely, Japan has established a Joint Crediting Mechanism/Bilateral 
Offset Credit Mechanism, a program under which Japan exports low carbon 
technologies to, and implements pollution mitigation actions in, developing 
countries to generate emissions reductions, or credits, which can be used to 
achieve Japan’s emission reduction target.244  Japan modeled this on the UN 
CDM:  it relies on bilateral agreements between Japan and developing 
countries whereby Japanese investors can fund emissions reduction projects 
in partner countries to generate emissions credits. 245   Japan signed 
agreements with Bangladesh, Vietnam, Mongolia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Laos, 
and Indonesia.246 
New Zealand’s system lacks quantitative limits on offsets. 247  
Unlimited NZUs may be purchased from the forestry sector and Kyoto 
flexibility mechanisms.248  Until May 31, 2015, an unlimited amount of 
international Kyoto units can be purchased by participants in the emissions 
trading system and surrendered to meet obligations.249  Regulated entities 
may also use UN CERs to meet their entire emissions reduction 
requirement.250  As a result of this unrestricted use of offsets, the majority of 
credits submitted under the New Zealand emission trading system have been 
disproportionately ERUs, RMUs, and CERs, as opposed to fixed price 
                                                      
243  MINISTRY OF ECON., TRADE, AND INDUS., J-CREDIT SCHEME 21, 23-25 (2013), available at 
http://japancredit.go.jp/pdf/english/credit_english_001_2.pdf.   
244  GOV’T OF JAPAN, RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE JOINT CREDITING MECHANISM 
(JCM)/BILATERAL OFFSET CREDIT MECHANISM (BOCM) 3 (2013), available at 
http://www.mmechanisms.org/document/20130523_JCMBOCM_goj.pdf. 
245  TALBERG & SWOBODA, supra note 100, at 23. 
246  SOPHER & MANSELL, supra note 163, at 6. 
247  SOPHER & MANSELL, supra note 164, at 4. 
248  TALBERG & SWOBODA, supra note 100, at 12; Pattrick Smellie, No Restrictions on Foreign-
sourced Carbon Credits Confirmed, THE NAT’L BUS. REV. (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.nbr.co.nz/article/ 
no-restrictions-foreign-sourced-carbon-credits-confirmed-bd-130869 (capping the use of foreign credits 
would compromise the emissions trading scheme principle of “least cost of compliance.”  In October 2012, 
New Zealand Units were worth $3 a ton, well below the $25 a ton price cap; carbon credits on the global 
market were worth as little as $2 a ton.). 
249  Surrendering Emissions Units, CLIMATE CHANGE INFO. NEW ZEALAND, 
http://www.climatechange.govt.nz/emissions-trading-scheme/obligations/surrendering-units.html (last 
visited May 8, 2014); CHRISTINA HOOD, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, REVIEWING EXISTING AND PROPOSED 
EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEMS 23, n. 14 (2010), available at http://www.iea.org/publications/ 
freepublications/publication/ets_paper2010.pdf. 
250  Sangim Han, South Korea Seeking CO2 Cuts at Home Before Allowing Offsets, BLOOMBERG (July 
24, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-25/south-korea-seeking-co2-cuts-at-home-before-
allowing-offsets-1-.html.  Since New Zealand refused to join the second Kyoto protocol compliance period, 
participants may not trade in any non-New Zealand CERs created after 2012.  TALBERG & SWOBODA, 
supra note 100, at 13. 
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allowances.251  Additionally, a 2012 amendment enables pre-1990 forest land 
owners to participate in an offsetting mechanism: they may avoid incurring 
liability for deforestation if new forest is established elsewhere.252 
The South Korea system permits offsetting with credits generated by 
CDM projects located in Korea from the start.253  Companies under the ETS 
will not be allowed to use international offsets through 2020.254  Starting in 
2021, however, regulated entities can use international offsets to meet at 
least ten percent of a liable entity’s surrender obligations, but the volume 
must not exceed the number of domestic offsets used.255  Simultaneously, 
the government is allocating as much as 97% of a company’s emission 
allowances for free between 2018 and 2020, and 90% after 2021.256 
Therefore, the emissions trading systems of Australia, China, Japan, 
New Zealand, and South Korea have three fundamental flaws.  First, they 
allocate emission allowances free of cost to specific emitters.  Free 
allocation artificially prolongs the use of fossil fuels by reducing the 
incentives for regulated entities to reduce emissions and shifting the cost of 
emissions reductions to the taxpayer.  Second, because allocation is often 
based on incomplete or self-reported historical emissions data, there is a 
substantial risk that inaccurate or manipulated data will result in surplus 
allowances. 257   When such over-allocation occurs, meaning the total 
emissions cap is set far higher than actual emissions, total emissions may 
actually increase under an emissions trading system, and fossil fuel intensive 
industries receive windfall profits.258  Third, regulated entities are permitted 
to use offsets to meet their emissions reduction requirements.  These offsets 
allow regulated entities to emit pollution above the cap, relying on credits 
that may or may not represent actual emissions reductions, and perpetuates 
reliance on fossil fuels.  While each of these factors alone should discourage 
                                                      
251 Luis Mundaca & Jessika Luth Richter, “Figure 2:  Carbon Credits Surrendered under the NZ ETS,” 
from Challenges for New Zealand’s Carbon Market, 3 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 1006-08 (2013), 
available at http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/v3/n12/fig_tab/nclimate2052_F2.html. 
252  SOPHER & MANSELL, supra note 164, at 3.  
253  Korea’s Emission Trading Scheme Receives Cabinet Approval, supra note 228. 
254  Sangim Han, supra 250; South Korea to Exclude International Carbon Offsets from ETS till 2020, 
CLIMATE POL. WATCHER (July 23, 2012), http://www.climate-policy-watcher.org/?q=node/369 (noting that 
beginning in 2021 Korean emitters may use international units to cover ten percent of their emissions, but 
the volume used must not exceed the number of domestic offsets used). 
255  Korea’s Emission Trading Scheme Receives Cabinet Approval, supra note 228. 
256  Sangim Han, supra note 250. 
257  See supra Part III.A.2; Gerard Wynn, Australia is Another Nail in Cap and Trade, REUTERS (Sept. 
11, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/11/column-wynn-australia-coidUSL5N0H62272 
0130911 (observing that “[i]t is hard to think of a successful scheme, with the European and two regional 
U.S. markets facing an oversupply of emissions allowances”). 
258  Wynn, supra note 257 (noting that the EU ETS “has handed tens of billions of dollars in windfall 
profits to electricity utilities, with barely a flicker of interest from energy consumers who footed the bill”). 
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countries from relying on emissions trading systems to reduce emissions, 
they are symptomatic of the larger, crucial shortcoming of emissions trading 
systems:  the prioritization of economic interests over environmental results 
and the assumption that human-induced climate change can be solved 
without relinquishing our dependence on fossil fuels. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Carbon emissions trading systems will not lower carbon dioxide 
emissions to safe levels.  The degree of legal, institutional, and technological 
investment required to implement and administer such systems undermines 
their alleged efficiency and delays implementation.  The inadequacy of data 
on carbon emissions and sinks, which is particularly pronounced for the 
forestry and agricultural sectors, undermines the effectiveness of these 
systems and makes measuring, monitoring, and verifying emissions and 
emissions credits costly.  It also limits the coverage of emissions trading 
systems to large facilities in a few sectors, making emissions trading an 
incomplete solution to climate change at best.  Finally, the practice of 
allocating allowances for free and permitting the use of offsets has the effect 
of artificially prolonging and even legitimizing the use of fossil fuels, while 
allowing regulated parties to increase emissions.  The emissions trading 
systems along the Pacific Rim will only ensure continued investment in 
fossil fuel technologies and economies, distracting policymakers from the 
substantial and systemic changes that might actually slow climate change.  
